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I. INTRODUCTION
On June 4, 1965, President Lyndon Baines Johnson delivered a histori-
cally powerful commencement address at Howard University.  Reflecting
upon the efficacy of the recently enacted Civil Rights Act,1 and as a prelude
to his imminent signing of the Voting Rights Act, President Johnson
proclaimed:
You do not take a person who, for years, has been hobbled by
chains and liberate him, bring him up to the starting line of a race
and then say, “you are free to compete with all the others” . . . .
Men and women of all races are born with the same range of abili-
ties.  But ability is not just the product of birth. . . .  Men are
shaped by their world.  When it is a world of decay, ringed by an
invisible wall, when escape is arduous and uncertain, and the sav-
ing pressures of a more hopeful society are unknown, it can crip-
ple the youth and it can desolate the men. . . .  Blighted hope
breeds despair.  Despair brings indifference to the learning which
offers a way out.  And despair, coupled with indifference, is often
the source of destructive rebellion against the fabric of society.2
Little did the President know that within two months, this vivid and
moving description of the plight of African-Americans and the potential for
their desperate and indifferent condition to erupt into a “destructive rebel-
lion” would prove prescient.
From August 11 until August 17, black citizens of Watts burned, looted,
and wreaked havoc throughout South Los Angeles.3  Rather than an urban
section of a major U.S. city, the region looked more like some foreign, war-
1 President Johnson had signed into law the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964 on July 2,
1964.
2 President Lyndon B. Johnson, Commencement Address at Howard University: “To Ful-
fill These Rights” (June 4, 1965), http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/com-
mencement-address-at-howard-university-to-fulfill-these-rights/, archived at https://perma.cc/
9N3K-S67Y [hereinafter HOWARD ADDRESS].  For an excellent discussion of President John-
son’s Howard Address and its backstory, see DAVID C. CARTER, THE MUSIC HAS GONE OUT OF
THE MOVEMENT: CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION, 1965-1968 3–13, 15–29
(2009).
3 See generally JERRY COHEN & WILLIAM S. MURPHY, BURN, BABY, BURN!: THE LOS
ANGELES RACE RIOTS OF AUGUST 1965 (1966).
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torn nation.4  The Watts riots — as they are most commonly known5 —
resulted in thirty-four deaths; injuries to over 1,000 people; nearly 4,000
arrests; and property damage in excess of $40 million.6
America had witnessed riots of a racial nature on a number of previous
occasions, by both whites and blacks.  Some were overtly racist in tone, like
the Chicago riots of 19197 and the Tulsa riots of 1921.8  Others seemed to
emanate from the growing problem of black mistreatment at the hands of
law enforcement.  Riots of this nature occurred as late as 1964 in Harlem,9
Rochester, and Philadelphia, as well as other cities.10
In light of this history, the uprising in Watts probably should not have
come as a great surprise, but it did, mainly because the magnitude of the
rage displayed and the extent of the carnage wrought was beyond anything
previously witnessed.11  The seeds of black despair and indifference, to
which President Johnson alluded, had been germinating for years, sprouting
occasionally, but never enough to garner broad national attention.  However,
in August of 1965, those seeds burst forth in full bloom for the entire nation
to see.
4 See, e.g., GERALD HORNE, THE FIRE THIS TIME: THE WATTS UPRISING AND THE 1960S
339 (1995) (observing that in the wake of the riots “South LA resembled Baghdad in the
aftermath of the Gulf War”).
5 But see id. at 45, 49 (questioning the accuracy of the label by observing that the unrest
actually spread well beyond the boundaries of Watts, though this area was the main focus of
the uprising); id. at 36 (noting the then-consensus that “this was not a riot.  It was an insurrec-
tion against all authority.”).
6 See COHEN & MURPHY, supra note 3, at 317–18.  There was informed speculation that R
the death toll may have been higher than reported. See id. at 163 (fire captain noting that
“many persons may have died in flaming structures, and the bodies, or what remained of them,
[sic] never discovered amid the massive, sooty rubble”).  In addition, property damage in the
entire curfew area, which encompassed a larger portion of South Central Los Angeles than
Watts, was estimated at $200 million. See HORNE, supra note 4, at 3. R
7 Here, rage over the alleged stoning and drowning death of a black youth led to a deadly
clash between black and white citizens on the south side of Chicago, an environment that was
already teaming with racial tension at that time. See REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY
COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 219 (1968) [hereinafter KERNER REPORT].
8 This white-fueled unrest resulted in devastating destruction to one of the most affluent
black areas in the country at that time.  For a detailed account of the Tulsa riots and their
aftermath, see generally ALFRED L. BROPHY, RECONSTRUCTING THE DREAMLAND: THE TULSA
RIOT OF 1921: RACE, REPARATION, AND RECONCILIATION (2002).
9 In July of 1964, the shooting death of a fifteen-year-old African-American boy by an off-
duty police officer spawned widespread unrest, including looting and burning, in Harlem and
Brooklyn. See JAMES T. PATTERSON, THE EVE OF DESTRUCTION: HOW 1965 TRANSFORMED
AMERICA 5 (2012); see also CARTER, supra note 2, at 58. R
10 See CARTER, supra note 2, at 25, 58; see also MICHAEL W. FLAMM, LAW AND ORDER: R
STREET CRIME, CIVIL UNREST, AND THE CRISIS OF LIBERALISM IN THE 1960S 37–38 (2005)
(discussing the riots that took place in Harlem and Rochester).  Riots also occurred in parts of
Florida, New Jersey, Ohio, and Illinois. See KERNER REPORT, supra note 7, at 35–36. R
11 President Johnson felt particularly blindsided by the riots because of the great strides
that he believed his administration had been making in the area of civil rights. See CARTER,
supra note 2, at 57 (noting that “Johnson felt betrayed after ‘all that [he] had done’ for black R
Americans”); see also id. at 170–71 (discussing expressions of collective surprise regarding
the riots and why that probably should not have been the case).
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A similarly tumultuous blossoming occurred in August 2014 in Fergu-
son, Missouri.  The precipitating event there, as with Watts, was a hostile
encounter between the police and a black citizen.  Although the personal toll
and physical destruction in Ferguson were much less severe than Watts, the
parallels between the two situations in terms of cause, effect, and govern-
mental response are palpable.
This Article critically examines the Watts riots and their aftermath in
comparison to the Ferguson situation, and demonstrates how little progress
America has made in a span of fifty years in the area of race relations.  More
importantly, the Article points to the politics of “law and order” as the pri-
mary culprit for this static social condition.  Lamentably, this state of affairs
has persisted notwithstanding the cogent articulation by a 1965 Presidential
Task Force Report of the true causes of the urban turmoil and a strategy for
addressing them.12  This Report, principally authored by Task Force Chair
and then-Deputy Attorney General Ramsey Clark, not only went unheeded
by the Johnson administration, but was actually not released to the public.
The disconcerting parallels between the problems and proposed solutions
articulated in the Clark Report and those in the Department of Justice’s in-
vestigation of Ferguson are profoundly discouraging, to say the least.
The Clark Report stressed that the Watts riots were directly linked to
the sense of hopelessness and despair prevalent among blacks in South Los
Angeles, which largely emanated from rampant unemployment (or under-
employment), poor education, and overly antagonistic police-community re-
lations.  Clark graphically depicted the dire situation faced by blacks in
Watts (and elsewhere), using the very words of the people to communicate
their desperation.  In his view, the riots were the culmination of years of
neglect, abuse, and frustration, and represented a manic attempt by the citi-
zens of Watts to obtain recognition.  They faced seemingly insurmountable
social and economic hurdles, and no one with the power to help appeared to
be paying attention.  Clark embraced Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.’s famous
statement that “a riot is the language of the unheard.”13  He listened intently
to what the rioters had to say and gained a deep understanding of their in-
tractable predicament.
Clark’s honest, unfiltered Report, however, got a tepid reception from
President Johnson, who feared the prospect of a negative public reaction.
The President preferred a response that was safer politically, and he there-
fore buried the Report, much to Clark’s dismay.  The serious problems the
Report identified, especially that of strained police-community relations,
persisted.
12 RAMSEY CLARK, ANDREW F. BRIMMER, AND JACK T. CONWAY, REPORT OF THE PRESI-
DENT’S TASK FORCE ON THE LOS ANGELES RIOTS, AUGUST, 1965 (Sept. 17, 1965) [hereinafter
CLARK REPORT].
13 MLK: A Riot is the Language of the Unheard, 60 Minutes, CBS NEWS (Sept. 27, 1966),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/mlk-a-riot-is-the-language-of-the-unheard/, archived at https://
perma.cc/RFW5-C3H8.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLC\52-2\HLC202.txt unknown Seq: 5  7-JUN-17 11:17
2017] Different Lyrics, Same Song 309
Not surprisingly, more riots occurred from 1965 through 1968, the most
devastating of which took place in Newark, Cleveland, and Detroit.  Presi-
dent Johnson responded by creating the National Advisory Commission on
Civil Disorders, better known as the Kerner Commission.  The Kerner Re-
port echoed many of the themes contained in the Clark Report, but painted
an even bleaker picture of the future of race relations in America and placed
primary blame for the problems of black citizens on white racism.  Although
President Johnson could not suppress the Kerner Report given its public na-
ture, he bristled at its content and balked at championing its message.  He
privately clung to the possibility that the Commission might conclude that
the riots were being conspiratorially fomented by “outside agitators,” such
as black power activists Stokely Carmichael and H. Rap Brown.14  This
would have been more consistent with the prevailing white reaction to the
riots, which was to condemn the conduct of the perpetrators — criminals
deserving of punishment, not concessions — and to side with police officers,
who were just doing their jobs, on issues related to the use of force.
Many liberals, accordingly, feared that accepting the positions espoused
in the Clark and Kerner Reports might trigger a white backlash at the voting
booth.  As a result, President Johnson and other liberal Democrats were
overly cautious in dealing with the intense racial and economic problems
that contributed significantly to the riots.  Instead of acknowledging the exis-
tence of these concerns and addressing them directly, they sought in vain to
construct a narrative about the riots that would be both constructive and
politically expedient.
Conservatives, on the other hand, were emboldened by the majority
white sentiment, and endeavored to capitalize on it by appealing to this
group’s demonstrable fear of the archetypal black criminal.  What America
needed at that time, according to California gubernatorial candidate Ronald
Reagan and presidential candidates Richard Nixon and George Wallace, was
“law and order.”15  In other words, law enforcement was not the problem; it
was the solution.
The appealing law-and-order narrative proved too strong to overcome.
It not only carried Reagan and Nixon into office, but also halted advance-
14 See CARTER, supra note 2, at 215 (observing that following his creation of the Kerner R
Commission, the President “continued to express interest in finding out whether there was a
conspiracy behind the rioting”); id. at 209 (pointing out that although President Johnson pub-
licly “refused to endorse widespread rumors of a black radical conspiracy” behind the riots,
“privately, he was far more receptive”).
15 See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS 46 (rev. ed. 2012) (observing that both Nixon and Wallace effectively em-
ployed “law and order” as the principal focus of their 1968 presidential campaigns); HORNE,
supra note 4, at 281 (discussing Reagan’s emphasis on “law and order” in his successful R
California gubernatorial campaign in 1966); Cathleen Decker, Watts Riots Shifted State to the
Right, But New Demographics Pushed It Left, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2015), http://www.latimes
.com/local/politics/la-me-pol-watts-politics-20150806-story.html, archived at https://perma.cc/
LDU8-MYYP (noting that during his campaign, Reagan called for increased law enforcement
and maintained that inner city streets had become “jungle paths after dark”).
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ments in civil rights — particularly in the areas of unemployment, educa-
tion, and perhaps most importantly, police-community relations — the three
central issues of the Clark Report.
To be sure, there were modest gains on various fronts in the area of race
relations over the years.  However, the great strides essential to real progress
were never undertaken in a meaningful manner.  The politics of law and
order served as the primary obstacle, opportunistically utilized by both par-
ties since 1965, most powerfully at the presidential level by the likes of
Ronald Reagan,16 George H. W. Bush,17 and even Bill Clinton.18  Moreover,
thanks to the Nixon- and Wallace-like rhetoric of President Donald Trump,
the politics of law and order again took center stage on the 2016 presidential
campaign trail; Trump extolled the virtues of the police and emphasized the
need for increased enforcement in order to stem the spread of crime.19  In
fact, channeling 1968-Nixon, Trump declared himself the “law and order
candidate” following the deadly sniper attack on police officers in Dallas,
Texas, on July 7, 2016,20 which occurred on the heels of the shooting deaths
16 See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 15, at 48 (noting that “[c]rime and welfare were the R
major themes of Reagan’s campaign rhetoric”).
17 See Julia Azari, From Wallace to Trump, The Evolution of “Law and Order,”
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Mar. 13, 2016), http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/from-wallace-to-trump-
the-evolution-of-law-and-order/, archived at https://perma.cc/AFW4-8UHW (pointing to
Bush’s infamous Willie Horton ad as one of the most vivid examples of the continuing promi-
nent role that crime played in presidential campaigns); see also ALEXANDER, supra note 15, at R
54 (discussing the Willie Horton ad and its obvious racialized law-and-order message).
18 See ALEXANDER, supra note 15, at 56 (observing that as a presidential candidate in R
1992, “Clinton vowed that he would never permit any Republican to be perceived as tougher
on crime than he”); Azari, supra note 17 (noting that Clinton “worked to shore up his ‘tough R
on crime’ credentials” both during his campaign and as president).
19 See Dana Liebelson & Nick Wing, Who Said It: Renounced Racist George Wallace or
Donald Trump? We Seriously Can’t Tell, HUFF. POST (Mar. 14, 2016), http://www.huffington
post.com/entry/donald-trump-george-wallace-quotes_us_56e710efe4b0b25c9182d7e5,
archived at https://perma.cc/LRP9-8C8S; see also Azari, supra note 17 (“There has to be R
some decorum . . . .  There has to be some law and order.”) (quoting Trump); Daniel Denvir,
The Long, Ugly History of “Law and Order” Candidates, CITYLAB (Sept. 16, 2015), http://
www.citylab.com/politics/2015/09/the-long-ugly-history-of-law-and-order-candidates/405709/
, archived at https://perma.cc/9RHD-QQQT (noting Trump’s complaint that Baltimore was
“set ‘back 35 years in one night because the police weren’t allowed to protect people.  We need
law and order!’”).
20 See David M. Jackson, Trump Declares Himself “Law and Order” Candidate, USA
TODAY (July 11, 2016), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/onpolitics/2016/07/11/
donald-trump-veterans-issues-virginia-beach/86947004/, archived at https://perma.cc/BQ34-
ZRJC (noting Trump’s description of himself as the “law and order candidate” and his pledge
to “increase[ ] support for police in the wake of last week’s mass killing in Dallas”); Christina
Wilkie, Donald Trump: “I Am the Law and Order Candidate”: Shades of Richard Nixon,
HUFF. POST (July 11, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/donald-trump-law-and-or-
der-candidate_us_5783e562e4b0344d51505dde, archived at https://perma.cc/X456-72PU (ob-
serving that by labeling “himself the ‘law and order’ candidate, . . . Trump has ripped a page
from the campaign playbook of Richard Nixon, who successfully ran for the presidency in
1968 as the ‘law and order’ candidate”); see also Joel Achenbach, et al., Five Dallas Police
Officers Were Killed By a Lone Attacker, Authorities Say, WASH. POST (July 8, 2016), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2016/07/08/like-a-little-war-snipers-shoot-
11-police-officers-during-dallas-protest-march-killing-five/, archived at https://perma.cc/
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of two black men, Alton Sterling and Philando Castile, by police officers in
Louisiana and Minnesota, respectively.21  Trump doubled down on July 18
after three more police officers were killed in Louisiana, Tweeting: “We
grieve for the officers killed in Baton Rouge today.  How many law enforce-
ment and people have to die because of a lack of leadership in our country?
We demand law and order.”22  Later, during his first presidential debate with
Hillary Clinton, the future President criticized his opponent’s apparent reluc-
tance to embrace “law and order,” and stressed its necessity for American
society: “Secretary Clinton doesn’t want to use a couple of words, and that’s
[sic] law and order.  We need law and order.  If we don’t have it, we’re not
going to have a country.  We need law and order in our country.”23
President Trump and other politicians conveniently overlook or ignore
the reality that if more law and order were really the answer, America should
not still have a significant crime and police-community relations problem.
But there is no doubt that it does.  Indeed, the DOJ’s Ferguson investigation
unmasked issues depressingly evocative of 1965-Watts.  So too are the con-
temporary reactions to those findings, as well as to the continuing pattern of
volatile interactions between law enforcement and citizens of color.  Indeed,
a comparison of the rhetoric of the 1960s with that of today, on both sides of
the issue, could make an objective observer legitimately wonder whether
America has been in stasis for the past half-century.  This Article exposes
the truth of this perception, critically examines one prominent cause — the
politics of law and order — and shines a revealing light on the most hopeful
avenue for positive change, embodied in a suppressed and forgotten fifty-
one year-old report.
Part II of the Article supplies the historical backdrop for analyzing the
effect of the politics of law and order by describing the details of the Watts
riots, the publics’ response, and the federal and state governments’ post-riot
investigations, especially that of the Presidential Task Force led by Ramsey
Clark.  It then proceeds to examine the aftermath of the riots in Part III,
FX6Z-9UZN (discussing shooting deaths of five Dallas police officers and the wounding of
seven others).
21 See Richard Faussett, et al., Alton Sterling Shooting in Baton Rouge Prompts Justice
Dept. Investigation, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/06/us/alton-
sterling-baton-rouge-shooting.html, archived at https://perma.cc/F6RL-Y8J9; T. Rees Shapiro,
“They’re They’re Slaying Us Like Animals”: Philando Castile’s Family Outraged at Police,
WASH. POST (July 7, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2016/07/
07/theyre-slaying-us-like-animals-philando-castiles-family-outraged-at-police, archived at
https://perma.cc/E4KL-FLN4.
22 Donald Trump on Baton Rouge Shooting: “We Demand Law and Order,” L.A. TIMES
(July 18, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-baton-rouge-police-killed-live-donald-
trump-on-baton-rouge-shooting-1468785394-htmlstory.html, archived at https://perma.cc/
C57J-KJTK.
23 David Fahrenthold, et al., First Presidential Debate: Trump Says Clinton Lacks “Stam-
ina,” Clinton Cites His Attacks on Women as “Pigs, Slobs and Dogs,” WASH. POST (Sept. 26,
2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/clinton-vs-trump-first-presidential-debate/
2016/09/26/4ef0c1a8-83f9-11e6-ac72-a29979381495_story.html, archived at https://perma.cc/
4QDG-GTJJ.
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which principally consisted of more of the same — riots, responsive call for
action, and then a return to the status quo.
In Part IV, the Article chronicles the dynamic of various American
leaders’ adoption of the politics of law and order as a response to urban
unrest and to crime in general, while exposing the lingering appeal and stul-
tifying effect of this strategy.  Part V demonstrates the staying power of the
politics of law and order through the example of Ferguson.  It recounts the
details surrounding the tragic police encounter and its explosive aftermath,
as well as the DOJ’s subsequent investigation, and then highlights some of
the distressing parallels between Watts and Ferguson.
While upsetting, this congruence between past and present need not be
viewed in a wholly negative light.  For this to be so, however, the stagnation
of the intervening fifty-one years must be acknowledged, and contemporary
events — such as Ferguson and the growing list of regretful clashes between
African-Americans and law enforcement24 — must be viewed collectively as
signifying that law and order alone will never alleviate the destructive de-
spair and indifference endemic within large portions of the black commu-
nity.  Indeed, the political use of law and order as a platform for responding
to civil disturbances and crime throughout this period has been a central
impediment to progress in race relations and equality in America.  If tangible
change is ever to occur, political expediency and opportunism must be cast
aside; and, in the words of the Clark Report, all people, including those most
affected, must be willing to exert “patient, determined, and massive effort”
to address the core problems of unemployment, inferior education, and com-
bative police-community relations.  Until this hard work is undertaken, the
tragic history of Watts may be destined to repeat itself.
24 See, e.g., Haeyoun Park & Jasmine C. Lee, Looking for Accountability in Police-In-
volved Deaths of Blacks, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/
2016/07/12/us/looking-for-accountability-in-police-involved-deaths-of-blacks.html, archived
at https://perma.cc/Y25H-5A8M (discussing recent high-profile incidents involving the deaths
of blacks stemming from police encounters, namely Philando Castile, Alton Sterling, Christian
Taylor, Samuel DuBose, Sandra Bland, Freddie Gray, Walter Scott, Laquan McDonald,
Michael Brown, and Eric Garner); Doug Stanglin & Melanie Eversley, Terence Crutcher’s
Death Listed as Homicide from Gunshot Wound, U.S.A. TODAY (Sept. 23, 2016), http://www
.usatoday.com/story/news/2016/09/22/charges-filed-against-police-officer-tulsa-shooting/
90858280/, archived at  https://perma.cc/3S9K-UUDL (describing an unarmed black man, Ter-
ence Crutcher, being shot and killed in Tulsa, Oklahoma by a police officer in September
2016); Jason Hanna, et al., Fallen Officers: 64 Shot Dead in the Line of Duty in 2016, CNN
(Dec. 13, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/08/14/us/police-officers-fatal-shooting-line-duty-
nationwide/, archived at https://perma.cc/FU5P-4B9S (recounting shootings of police officers
throughout the country in 2016).
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II. THE WATTS RIOTS OF 1965
A. The Arrests of Marquette, Ronald, and Rena Frye
On August 11, 196525 — just five days after President Johnson’s mo-
mentous signing of the Voting Rights Act — Marquette Frye, with his step-
brother Ronald as a passenger, was stopped by a California Highway
Patrolman (Officer Lee Minikus) on suspicion of drunk driving.26  The tone
of the encounter was uncharacteristically cordial and lighthearted.27  Accord-
ing to Marquette, “The officer that stopped me was as polite as an officer of
the law can be.  I mean the reason that most people started gathering around
was because I was joking with the officer — I mean we was getting along,
getting along.”28
Meanwhile, a woman informed Rena Frye — Marquette’s mother and
Ronald’s stepmother — about what was happening.29  She immediately
rushed from her nearby apartment to the scene of the police stop, first
preventing the towing of her car,30 which Marquette had been driving, and
then scolding her son once she realized he was intoxicated.31  Rena’s public
berating of Marquette dramatically changed the tenor of the situation.  Mar-
quette quickly went from jovial and cooperative to angry and defiant, vehe-
mently refusing to be arrested.32
His resistance caused the several officers now present to utilize more
aggressive measures to subdue him.  When this failed, sensing the growing
hostility of the expanding throng of onlookers, the officers called for exten-
sive reinforcements.33  One bystander claimed that as many as twenty-seven
squad cars converged on the scene.34  Ultimately, one of the patrolmen, as-
25 Some have suggested that the atypically hot temperature that day may have played a
role in escalating the tensions in Watts. See HORNE, supra note 4, at 53. R
26 COHEN & MURPHY, supra note 3, at 26–27.  Officer Minikus stopped Marquette Frye R
after receiving a tip from an unidentified black citizen who had observed what he described as
a “reckless driver.” See id. at 26.  There seems to be little doubt that Marquette was intoxi-
cated at the time of the stop. See id. at 29–30.
27 See id. at 29–30.
28 Id.  Officer Minikus’s account was consistent with Marquette’s assessment.  He main-
tained that “there couldn’t have been a better approach between officer and defendant at the
time.” Id. at 29.
29 See id. at 31.
30 See id. at 31–32.
31 See id. at 33 (“You’ve been drinking — I can smell it on your breath.  You know you
shouldn’t drive when you’ve been drinking.  You better go with the officers.”) (quoting Rena
Frye).
32 See id.  Marquette reportedly walked away and screamed: “Those mother-fucking cops
ain’t going to take me to jail. . . .  You’re going to have to kill me to take me to jail.” Id. at 34;
see also Valerie Reitman & Mitchell Landsberg, Watts Riots, 40 Years Later, L.A. TIMES (Aug.
11, 2005), http://articles.latimes.com/2005/aug/11/local/la-me-watts11aug11, archived at
https://perma.cc/488E-APV5 (quoting Officer Minikus as saying “[e]verything was going
fine with the arrest until his mama got there”). See also HORNE, supra note 4, at 55. R
33 See COHEN & MURPHY, supra note 3, at 35. R
34 See id.
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sisting Officer Minikus, allegedly jabbed Marquette in the stomach with his
riot baton, and then struck him on the brow after a brief struggle.35  Now
dazed, Marquette was forcibly dragged to the patrol car by Officer Minikus,
thrown face-first into the front seat, and handcuffed.36
Rena and Ronald attempted to intervene on Marquette’s behalf, with
Rena purportedly jumping on the back of one officer.37  After a brief scuffle,
both Rena and Ronald were combatively apprehended and handcuffed, and
then placed in the backseat of the patrol car with Marquette.38  A sizable
horde of Watts residents observed the entire episode, many questioning the
level of force and manpower exerted to arrest the Fryes.39
There are disputes concerning the details of this encounter,40 but there is
no denying that a routine traffic stop devolved into an ugly confrontation
that ended with Marquette, Rena, and Ronald Frye being driven away in a
patrol car as a very large contingent of their community angrily watched.
Various exaggerated tales of the events of that August afternoon spread
quickly throughout Watts, the most inflammatory being that a pregnant on-
looker — Joyce Gaines — had been roughed up and arrested by the police.41
One of the officers believed that Ms. Gaines had spit on another officer.  As
a result, he seized her from the crowd and then dragged her away.42  Some
observers mistakenly thought that Ms. Gaines, a barber, was pregnant be-
cause the smock that she wore resembled a maternity dress.43  Inflated ru-
mors, such as this one, combined with the truth to set off six days of
unprecedented rioting in South Los Angeles.
B. Burn, Baby, Burn!
The unrest in Watts began when the police officers tried to leave the
area following the Fryes’ arrests.  They had difficulty getting through the
assembled crowd and their vehicles were pelted with bottles and rocks.44
Soon thereafter chaos reigned in the streets of Watts for the remainder of that
35 See id. at 36.
36 See id. at 37.  One witness recalled that the police “took [Marquette] and threw him in
the car like a bag of laundry and kicked his feet in and slammed the door.”  Reitman &
Landsberg, supra note 32. R
37 See COHEN & MURPHY, supra note 3, at 37. R
38 See id. at 37–39.
39 See id. at 39–41.  One member of the crowd bristled at rough police efforts to keep a
handcuffed Marquette Frye in the patrol car, shouting, “Why did you have to do that? . . .  That
boy’s already handcuffed and bleeding.  You didn’t have to do that.” Id. at 39.  Another on-
looker exclaimed: “Does it take all these people to arrest three people?” Id.
40 For another account of the arrests, see HORNE, supra note 4, at 54–55 (suggesting that R
the police used force that was not justified and were therefore clearly the aggressors).
41 See COHEN & MURPHY, supra note 3, at 56–59. R
42 See id. at 53–56.
43 See id. at 59; see also HORNE, supra note 4, at 55 (noting that the “idea that a woman in R
that condition had been assaulted by authorities” who were known to engage in similar behav-
ior “incited the crowd”).
44 See COHEN & MURPHY, supra note 3, at 61–62. R
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Wednesday evening late into the night.  Avalon Boulevard — one of the
main thoroughfares — was like a war zone, with bottles and slabs of cement
being hurled at any vehicle that ventured into the area.45  Cars were over-
turned or set on fire, and occupants dragged out and beaten.46
The local police believed the mob’s ire would dissipate if they removed
themselves from the scene of the encounter with the Fryes.47  This strategy
failed and the officers soon returned to Watts in full force.48  The citizens
greeted their presence with hostility,49 and many of the officers responded in
kind.50  Rather than reducing the riotous behavior, the heavy-handed rejoin-
der escalated the situation.  One observer noted that the police officers
were hitting everyone.  Girls and little kids.  The cops drove up to
clusters of people and got out and started swinging their billy-
clubs. . . .  There probably wouldn’t have been another night after
that, if it hadn’t been for them hitting the little kids.51
Some thought the rioting would amount to a one-day outpouring of
rage.52  A community meeting arranged to ensure that the events from the
previous night were not repeated was overtaken by angry teenagers who
blamed the violence on police brutality.53  At dusk on that Thursday, the
rioting resumed, but this time, in addition to the rock throwing, physical
attacks, and vehicle fires, the citizens also looted and burned businesses.54
Shooting occurred as well, and in the ensuing days, the breadth of the rioting
expanded into other areas of South Los Angeles, eventually inspiring the
imposition of a curfew across a forty-six mile radius.55
By the third day, it was apparent that the Los Angeles Police Depart-
ment alone could not control the growing discord, especially the burning and
the looting.  Consequently, the state enlisted the California National Guard
to assist the police.56  This enhanced show of force, however, did not have
45 See id. at 67.
46 See id.
47 See HORNE, supra note 4, at 56 (“Police tried pulling back and closing off the area R
where the rioting was worst on the theory that their absence might calm things down.”).
48 See COHEN & MURPHY, supra note 3, at 68–69. R
49 See, e.g., id. at 70 (“As motor officers penetrated the crowd, youths pelted them with
rocks and other objects.”).
50 See, e.g., id. (“The police was chasing kids, ah, up and down the street, and he hit a
young man in the head with his club.”).
51 Id. at 72.
52 See id. at 81 (noting that on Thursday morning, “it seemed to all appearances, merely a
time to assess the statistics of the long, violent night and inscribe them in police records”); see
also id. at 86 (observing that “a sense of urgency and a sense of appreciation of what lay
behind Wednesday night’s disorder appeared lacking”). But see id. at 85 (indicating that Los
Angeles Police Chief William Parker “sensed that the early morning quiet might be deceptive”
and considered the manner in which the riots had stopped to have been “unusual”).
53 See id. at 86–87.
54 See id. at 92, 95.
55 See id. at 106–07.
56 See id. at 129, 164–70.
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the anticipated calming effect.  Confrontations between law enforcement and
the people increased, along with the looting and burning of local
businesses.57
While looting was a major component of the rioting in Watts, arson was
perhaps an even more dominant feature.58  In fact, the rallying cry for the
rioters was “burn, baby, burn!”59  The majority of the burning and looting
was directed at white-owned businesses, but because of the derisive nature
of the rebellion, black businesses were not safe from attack.60  To make mat-
ters worse, snipers and rock throwers frustrated the efforts of firefighters to
contain the widespread conflagration.61
Although intense rioting persisted through Sunday evening, from that
point forward, there was a steady decrease in the amount of unrest.62  This
was probably the result of a combination of the presence of the National
Guard, the imposition of a curfew, and sheer fatigue.  By the evening of
Tuesday, August 17, the Watts riots were essentially over.63
C. Local Government’s Reaction to the Riots
In the face of the widely-held view that antagonistic police-community
relations had contributed greatly to the riots, Los Angeles Chief of Police
William Parker and Mayor Sam Yorty were quick to defend law enforcement
and lay blame at the feet of the rioters and others who may have inspired
their anarchistic behavior.  Parker believed that so-called “civil rights zeal-
ots”64 were the heart of the problem: “You cannot tell people to disobey the
57 See id. at 182–83.
58 See id. at 158; see also HORNE, supra note 4, at 81 (noting on August 14, “scores of R
fires raged out of control”).
59 See COHEN & MURPHY, supra note 3, at 95 (noting that “as each new car or business R
establishment shuddered from the force of an exploding Molotov cocktail, then was engulfed
by flame, onlookers chortled raucously: ‘Burn, baby, burn!’”); see also id. at 204.  The catch-
phrase is attributed to a popular Los Angeles disc jockey known as Magnificent Montague.
See HORNE, supra note 4, at 327.  However, originally it had nothing to do with actual fire; R
Montague used it in reference to music that he found to be particularly enjoyable. See Bob
Baker, Watts: The Legacy: “Burn, Baby, Burn!”: What Began as a Radio Disc Jockey’s Soulful
Cry of Delight Became a National Symbol of Urban Rebellion, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 12, 1985),
http://articles.latimes.com/1985-08-12/local/me-4003_1_disc-jockey, archived at https://perma
.cc/48RB-4DV5.
60 Many black proprietors would place signs on their businesses, identifying them in a
manner that they hoped would cause the rioters to direct their rage elsewhere — “Blood
Brother” or “This is a Negro Business” or “Soul Brother.” See COHEN & MURPHY, supra
note 3, at 96; HORNE, supra note 4, at 111.  Such efforts, however, were often to no avail. See R
COHEN & MURPHY, supra note 3, at 96. R
61 One firefighter likened the venture of arriving at a burning store in Watts to “riding
through a shooting gallery.” COHEN & MURPHY, supra note 3, at 159. See also id. at 158
(“firemen were forced to abandon their efforts to put out the flames, in some cases, due to the
rioters”).
62 See id. at 231 (observing that “on each succeeding day, an ebbtide was noticeable”).
63 See id. at 238 (noting that the rioting officially “ended on Tuesday night with the lifting
of the curfew”).
64 Id. at 68.
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law and not expect them to have a disrespect for the law.  You cannot keep
telling them that they are being abused and mistreated without expecting
them to react.”65  Rather than acknowledging the need to enhance police-
community relations and ease tension between black citizens and the Los
Angeles Police Department (“LAPD”), Chief Parker viewed the riots as evi-
dence of the need for cracking down more harshly on criminal activity,
maintaining that: “[I]f the citizens of Los Angeles haven’t learned from the
riot that they must support strong law enforcement, ‘next time they’ll blow
up the whole city.’” 66
Chief Parker also publicly criticized the California Highway Patrol
(“CHP”) for its inept handling of the Fryes’ arrests, maintaining that if the
LAPD had made the arrests — with its superior training and experience —
the rioting would have never occurred.67  This self-laudatory and simplistic
explanation for the riots angered many and diverted attention away from
analyzing the possible underlying causes of the unrest.
Instead of constructively redirecting the debate, Mayor Yorty came to
the defense of Chief Parker and added further fuel to the law-and-order nar-
rative that had begun.  He first mocked the idea that police brutality could
have been the cause of the riots, referring to the concept as the “big lie”
perpetuated by outside antagonists.68  In a letter urging the Los Angeles Dis-
trict Attorney to investigate CHP’s actions on August 11, Yorty contended
that: “Communists, fellow travelers, dupes, and demagogues have . . . delib-
erately foment[ed] antagonism to law enforcement officers, inciting the re-
sidents to resent and resist officers in the proper professional performance of
their always difficult and dangerous duty to protect the rights of law-abiding
citizens to be secure in their persons and property.”69  In other words, be-
cause of the negative attitude created towards the police in the community,
they necessarily had to exercise force in order to apprehend angry, resistant
lawbreakers.70
Yorty went on to suggest that the LAPD was in a no-win situation,
frustrated and perplexed by inflated anecdotes concerning its law enforce-
ment activities.71  In his view, the police could be perfectly correct and re-
strained, but would still be “subjected to false, exaggerated, and malicious
charges and rumors deliberately calculated to create tension and increase the
65 Id. at 69; see also id. at 277 (“Those who advocate the violation of laws that have
neither been repealed nor declared unconstitutional advocate anarchy.”); Scott Martelle, View-
ing the Watts Riots Through Different Eyes, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2015), http://www.latimes
.com/opinion/opinion-la/la-ol-watts-reactions-kennedy-king-johnson-eisenhower-20150810-
story.html, archived at https://perma.cc/H8CU-2VK2 (“People have lost all respect for the
law.  An outgrowth of civil disobedience has been built up.”).
66 COHEN & MURPHY, supra note 3, at 277–78. R
67 See id. at 279–80.
68 See id. at 280–81.
69 Id. at 281.
70 See id. (observing that the “campaign against the police has fostered a highly charged
atmosphere into which our policemen must go to perform their duties”).
71 See id.
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difficulty of their work.”72  Such an atmosphere, according to Yorty, hurts
morale and undermines the ability of officers to effectively protect “law-
abiding citizens.”73  He further suggested that the riots might serve a con-
structive purpose if they were properly recognized as a harbinger concerning
the untenable plight of law enforcement.74
The balance of Yorty’s letter sharply — and at times erroneously75 —
criticized CHP’s actions on August 11 and implied that its ineptitude sparked
the riots.76  As with Parker’s comments, Yorty’s defensive reaction did not
reflect any semblance of concern for what might have created the hostile
atmosphere that erupted into a full-blown rebellion.  Yorty opted for a politi-
cally-inspired message that he thought would appeal to the majority white
population, diverting attention from the fundamental problems of poor race
relations and unequal treatment of blacks.  He failed to appreciate that by
ignoring the latter, he was engaging in the same sort of conduct that helped
fuel the underlying rage: indifference toward the social predicament of
Watts’ citizens.  Unfortunately, Yorty and Parker were not alone in viewing
the riots through this myopic law-and-order lens.  As will be elaborated upon
in the next section, this mindset was prevalent among white Americans at
the time, including a number of prominent national politicians.
D. White America’s Reaction to the Riots
According to most accounts, the overwhelming white response to the
riots — especially from those in close proximity to the unrest — was “to
condemn the lawlessness, the impatience, and the destruction.”77  It was
widely felt that the black community “lack[ed] gratitude for recent eco-
nomic and civil rights advances.”78  The perception was that blacks were
getting everything they wanted from the Johnson administration, and they
still were not satisfied.79  Instead, they revolted by burning and looting white
72 Id.
73 See id. at 282 (“What would law-abiding citizens do if they called and there were no
policemen willing to answer the call?”).
74 See id. (“The recent destructive riots may serve some useful purpose if they awaken the
nation to the dangers inherent in the deteriorating ability of law enforcement agencies to func-
tion effectively.”).
75 Cf. id. at 285 (noting that there were “several points in the mayor’s letter which his
critics would take issue with”).
76 See id. at 283–84.
77 CLARK REPORT, supra note 12, at 23. See also HORNE, supra note 4, at 280–84 (dis- R
cussing the so-called “white backlash” that followed the riots, most notably among those that
had previously sympathized with the plight of blacks); PATTERSON, supra note 9, at 186 (not- R
ing the “rising white backlash . . ., especially in working class areas close to black neighbor-
hoods” in the aftermath of the Watts riots).
78 CLARK REPORT, supra note 12, at 23. R
79 See HORNE, supra note 4, at 280 (quoting one white citizen as telling the President that R
“white people . . . are getting real tired of the kinky haired, thick lipped blacks who are giving
so much trouble . . . you and the Kennedys have given them everything they have asked for —
when do you plan to stop?”); see also CLARK REPORT, supra note 12, at 43 (noting that follow- R
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businesses, and physically attacking innocent white citizens.  From the ma-
jority white perspective, the government’s response to the Watts rebellion
should have been to crack down on the disorder by tightening police control
in urban areas, rather than softening relations between law enforcement and
the black community.80  There was strong opposition to any type of response
that could be interpreted as rewarding this behavior,81 which many viewed as
inspired by nefarious elements antagonistic to the rule of law.82
Corresponding attitudes were expressed on the floors of the United
States House and Senate, with some members of Congress going so far as to
attribute the unrest to the culture of black civil disobedience promoted by
Martin Luther King, Jr. and his followers.83  There were also intimations that
other national leaders bore responsibility and that purported “outside agita-
tors” had encouraged the violence.84  For example, South Carolina Represen-
tative Albert Watson stated:
The insurrection they are experiencing in California is the respon-
sibility of the President, his Attorney General, the Federal courts
and such professional troublemakers as Martin [Luther] King. . . .
Repeatedly [King] has advocated the violation of local law, and
he and his cohorts have led thousands of Americans into a life of
civil disobedience.85
South Carolina Senator Donald Russell bemoaned the irony of the vio-
lence coming “in the wake of the most sweeping civil rights laws in the
Nation’s history,” and expressed sadness over the fact that “the civil rights
leaders, in pursuit of worthy aims, have done so much to breed disrespect for
the law.”86
ing “the passage of the major pieces of civil rights legislation, some [felt] that Negroes [had]
achieved the primary goals for which they were struggling and that the time [had] come to
shift the expenditure of energies in other directions”).
80 See id. at 23 (noting that “[m]any feel that relief and welfare should be reduced and
police control tightened”); see also id. at 22 (observing that the riots “generated strong support
for the Police Department as the representative of law and order”).
81 See CLARK REPORT, supra note 12, at 23 (indicating that “many in the white commu- R
nity have expressed a determination not to yield to demands related to violence and feel that
assistance to the riot areas rewards lawlessness”).  Representative Richard Ichord of Missouri
warned: “If any pity is shown in these cases it will serve to stimulate similar outbreaks all over
the country.  If civil, political, or economic gains are made solely because of this riot then our
society is sick.”  89 CONG. REC. H20754 (daily ed. Aug. 17, 1965) (statement of Rep. Ichord).
82 See CLARK REPORT, supra note 12, at 23 (“Many see a close connection between peace- R
ful demonstrations and rioting.  They fear a breakdown in respect for the law.”); FLAMM,
supra note 10, at 63 (noting that a survey of white Californians revealed that a large majority R
of them believed that the riots were caused by “outside agitators” or a general “lack of respect
for law and order”).
83 See ALEXANDER, supra note 15, at 40–41 (observing that many conservative legislators R
during this period maintained that Dr. King’s “philosophy of civil disobedience was a leading
cause of crime”).
84 See FLAMM, supra note 10, at 63. R
85 89 CONG. REC. H20792 (daily ed. Aug. 17, 1965) (statement of Rep. Watson).
86 89 CONG. REC. S20614–15 (daily ed. Aug. 17, 1965) (statement of Sen. Russell).
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Furthermore, Alabama Representative James Martin extolled what
would become, in the years ahead, a rallying cry in local and national elec-
tions.  Specifically, he called upon “responsible leaders [to] help bring
about a decent respect for law and order;” and demanded a cessation of the
“verbal lynching of policemen who are being used as an excuse for every
robber, rapist, and murderer who sets himself against society and the civi-
lized rules which must govern society.”87
Minnesota Senator Walter Mondale offered a powerful retort to such
accusatory rhetoric. Calling it demagoguery, he maintained that
The only thing we can blame on the civil rights movement is the
act of making America — white and black — aware of the plight
of the American Negro.  Thus, to blame the civil rights movement
for what happened in Los Angeles is like blaming the man who
turns [o]n a fire alarm for setting the fire.88
He concluded his remarks with a disquieting observation regarding the
lack of progress in the area of race relations, punctuated with a pep talk of
sorts that reflected the substance of President Johnson’s Howard speech:
[T]he . . . rioting (in Los Angeles) was a terrible reminder that in
the century since emancipation we have only substituted misery
and hopelessness and hatred for the bondsman’s chains. . . .  We
cannot respond to this outburst of anguish by continuing the old
ways of discrimination and deprivation which brought it about. . . .
We must . . . try to open the doors of hope for these people . . . .
And in so doing, we will [d]efuse the time bombs [that] are tick-
ing away in the slums of our cities.89
Senator Mondale discerningly captured the tone and message of the
forthcoming Clark Report: unless the underlying problems contributing to
the riots were addressed in a focused and diligent fashion by all constituen-
cies, the prospect for further civil unrest would remain.
E. The Federal Government’s Response
1. President Johnson’s Reaction
Given his powerful, moving words to the Howard graduates, foretelling
the very “destructive rebellion” that occurred in Watts, one might have ex-
pected a nodding acknowledgment from President Johnson, accompanied by
a decisive and potent response.  Instead, the President reacted with dismay
87 89 CONG. REC. H20757 (daily ed. Aug. 17, 1965) (statement of Rep. Martin); see also
HORNE, supra note 4, at 152 (recounting LAPD Chief William Parker’s assessment that the R
“most downtrodden, oppressed, dislocated minority” in the country was the police).
88 89 CONG. REC. S20625 (daily ed. Aug. 17, 1965) (statement of Sen. Mondale).
89 Id. at S20626.
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and anger,90 and for an extended period of time following the onset of the
riots, he was incommunicado, seemingly paralyzed by the perplexing and
devastating nature of the unrest.91  When he finally issued a statement, it was
highly political in tone, studiously designed to appease the white masses by
condemning the rebellion and drawing an unfortunate analogy to the Ku
Klux Klan: “A rioter with a Molotov cocktail in his hands is not fighting for
civil rights any more than a Klansman with a sheet on his back and a mask
on his face.  They are both . . . lawbreakers, destroyers of constitutional
rights and liberties, and ultimately destroyers of a free America.”92
President Johnson’s sharp rebuke was quickly tempered somewhat by
his approval of a number of federal initiatives carefully directed toward
black families in the troubled area.93  In doing so, he was cautious to avoid
the creation of any perception that his administration might be rewarding the
rioters.94  As a result, these efforts did not receive great fanfare,95 nor did his
appointment of a small federal task force chaired by Deputy Attorney Gen-
eral Ramsey Clark.
2. Ramsey Clark and the President’s Task Force
The President’s Task Force on the Los Angeles Riots, as it was officially
known, was charged with “develop[ing] with Governor [Pat] Brown,
Mayor [Sam] Yorty and other officials, a combined program to restore and
rehabilitate the damaged areas of Los Angeles” and “to wipe out the causes
of such violent outbursts.”96  Other members of the Task Force included An-
drew Brimmer (Assistant Secretary of Economic Affairs for the U.S. Depart-
ment of Commerce) and Jack Conway (Deputy Director of the Office of
Economic Opportunity).97  Roger Wilkins, who was then the Deputy Direc-
90 See CARTER, supra note 2, at 56 (observing that the “outbreak of rioting in Watts R
shocked Johnson and fueled emotions that careened between rage and profound depression”);
see also id. at 170 (noting that Johnson “saw Watts as an act of collective political ‘betrayal’ by
black America”); supra note 11.
91 See CARTER, supra note 2, at 56 (noting that “[a]fter an initial warning to White House R
aides to steer clear of any involvement in Los Angeles, [Johnson] drove around [his] sprawl-
ing [Texas] ranch for hours, refusing to take telephone calls, even from close aide Joseph
Califano, for several days”).
92 Id. at 60–61.
93 See id. at 61 (indicating that the President quickly instructed his aide Joseph Califano
and his special counsel Lee White “to prepare a range of ‘ameliorative’ federal responses”);
see also CLARK REPORT, supra note 12, at 3 (“On September 2, 1965, the President approved R
an interim report on 49 programs and project grants to provide immediate assistance to all
sections of Los Angeles in need of help.”).
94 See CARTER, supra note 2, at 61 (noting that the “programs were to be targeted care- R
fully at families so that there would be no perception of directly rewarding the activities of the
rioters themselves”).
95 See id. (observing the “[b]ehind the scenes” nature of these efforts).
96 CLARK REPORT, supra note 12, at 1–2. R
97 See id. at 63; ROGER WILKINS, A MAN’S LIFE: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 172 (1982).
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tor of the Community Relations Service, also served as an integral part of
the team.98
Ramsey Clark’s pristine legal pedigree and his noteworthy credentials
in the area of civil rights made him well-suited for this complex assignment.
His maternal grandfather, William Ramsey, served as a judge on the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals, and later as a justice of the Texas Supreme
Court.99  Clark’s paternal grandfather was a well-known Dallas attorney, who
served at one time as president of the Texas Bar Association,100 and his father
was none other than U.S. Supreme Court Justice Tom C. Clark, who, prior to
his elevation to the Supreme Court, had served as Attorney General under
President Harry Truman.101
Clark practiced antitrust law in the family firm after graduating from
the University of Chicago Law School,102 but in 1961 decided to devote his
skills to public service.  Through his family’s political connections he ob-
tained the position of Assistant Attorney General for the Lands Division.103
Because his southern roots and “good-old-boy” disposition enabled him to
“pass” for a local citizen — making him a highly effective watchdog —
Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy drafted Clark to participate substan-
tially in the administration’s monitoring of various high-profile civil rights
matters in the South.104  While Clark’s southern, white gentility was an asset
in his prior civil rights activities,105 these qualities would appear to have been
a liability in endeavoring to communicate with and address the problems of
an angry, urban black constituency.  Even Clark’s right-hand man in the in-
98 See WILKINS, supra note 97, at 169.  Wilkins was already in Los Angeles, having ac- R
companied Community Relations Service Director LeRoy Collins there, along with George
Culbertson, as an advance team to look into the riots, at the behest of President Johnson. Id. at
162–63.  He was directed to work with Clark as a “link between the first team that had been
out there and the second.” Id. at 169.
99 See MIMI GRONLUND, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE TOM C. CLARK: A LIFE OF SERVICE 25
(2010).  For a fuller treatment of Ramsey Clark’s background, see generally ALEX WOHL, FA-
THER, SON, AND CONSTITUTION (2012). See also Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., Representing Saddam
Hussein: The Importance of Being Ramsey Clark, 42 GA. L. REV. 47, 54–101 (2007).
100 See GRONLUND, supra note 99, at 13. R
101 See id. at 85. Notably, Tom and Ramsey Clark are the only father and son attorneys
general in the nation’s history.
102 See Josh Saunders, Ramsey Clark’s Prosecution Complex: How Did Lyndon Johnson’s
Attorney General Come to Defend Dictators, War Criminals and Terrorists?, LEGAL AFF.
(Nov./Dec. 2003), at 42–43.
103 See C. DAVID HEYMANN, RFK: A CANDID BIOGRAPHY OF ROBERT F. KENNEDY 192
(1998).
104 See VICTOR S. NAVASKY, KENNEDY JUSTICE 26 (1971); Interview with Ramsey Clark,
Former Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, in New York, NY (Nov. 8, 2008).
105 Among other things, Clark worked tirelessly to ensure peaceful enforcement of the
federal school desegregation mandate, including the historic admission of the first African-
American (James Meredith) to the University of Mississippi.  Interview by Harri Baker with
Ramsey Clark in Falls Church, Va. (Feb. 11, 1969), http://www.lbjlibrary.net/assets/docu-
ments/archives/oral_histories/clark_r/clark-r2.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/ZG92-J4DV.
After President Kennedy’s assassination and Lyndon Johnson’s ascension to the presidency,
Clark was retained in the administration, and eventually elevated in 1965 to Deputy Attorney
General, the position he held when tapped to chair the President’s Task Force. See id.
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vestigation — Roger Wilkins, the nephew of National NAACP Chair Roy
Wilkins — was initially skeptical of President Johnson’s choice.106  Clark’s
compassionate and sincere approach to this difficult work, however, quickly
changed Wilkins’ opinion.107
Clark employed a grassroots strategy in carrying out his duties as chair.
Besides meeting personally with pertinent city officials, he and Wilkins con-
ducted numerous town-hall type gatherings, affording virtually every inter-
ested resident of Watts an opportunity to speak his or her mind.108  In Clark’s
words:
We met from the very first day for many hours every day with
practically every type of ghetto group and organization . . . .  We
went out to . . . churches . . . to parks . . . to houses and neighbor-
hood youth centers, and just wherever a large number of people
could be accumulated, to see what they were thinking, how they
analyzed the riots and the cause of the riots.109
The key, though, was that Clark was not merely going through the mo-
tions.  He was open-minded, sincere, and extraordinarily empathetic.110  As
such, he did not simply offer the people of Watts an opportunity to vent, he
also listened attentively.111  Wilkins notably remarked that he had never wit-
nessed “a powerful white man take poor black strangers seriously
before. . . .  [Clark] was more sensitive to the problems of poor blacks than
[Wilkins] imagined any white man could be.”112
Much of the language used by the citizens was harsh and the message
accusatory,113 directed almost exclusively at white people, especially white
106 See CARTER, supra note 2, at 172 (noting Wilkins’s initial temptation to dismiss Clark R
as essentially a lackey of the federal government); see also WILKINS, supra note 97, at 171 R
(expressing anger because of his initial impression that Clark would conduct a superficial
investigation and not meet with black citizens).
107 See WILKINS, supra note 97, at 172 (noting that in observing Clark’s interaction with R
black citizens of Watts, Wilkins was “deeply moved” . . . and “[a]s the hours passed, [he]
began to love him”).
108 See CLARK REPORT, supra note 12, at 61 (stating that the “task force . . . talked with R
virtually every element of public and private interest and responsibility in the Los Angeles
area”).
109 Interview by Harri Baker with Ramsey Clark in Falls Church, Va. (Mar. 21, 1969),
http://www.lbjlibrary.net/assets/documents/archives/oral_histories/clark_r/clark-r3.pdf.
archived at https://perma.cc/ZG92 [hereinafter Clark Oral History III].
110 See CARTER, supra note 2, at 172 (pointing out that Clark was “clearly moved by what R
he had heard” in Watts).
111 See id. (observing that Clark “listened” and “took copious notes while those in attend-
ance, their indignation often coming out, shared accounts of all the problems — most notably
police brutality — they faced in Watts”).
112 WILKINS, supra note 97, at 172. R
113 See CLARK REPORT, supra note 12, at 16 (observing that the citizens’ views were “ex- R
pressed with emotion, urgency and eloquence — but in many instances, with simple
harshness”).
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police officers.114  Ramsey Clark, nevertheless, calmly and respectfully lis-
tened to and digested everything that the Watts residents had to say.115  They
had much to share about their lot in life, but no one in power, until Clark,
had seemingly been willing to pay attention.  He recognized that this frus-
trating sense of isolation and virtual invisibility, at least in part, fueled the
social explosion that began on August 11, and he was committed to ensuring
that the people would not go unheard this time.
3. The Clark Report: Employment, Education, and Police-
Community Relations
The Task Force’s Report is perhaps the best evidence of Ramsey Clark’s
commitment to conveying the actual feelings and perceptions of the people
of Watts.  Principally drafted by Clark and Wilkins, the report highlighted
the experience of Watts residents in their own words, eschewing any attempt
at sanitization.116 For example, on the subject of unemployment: “We are
discriminated against in hiring, in promotion, in all aspects of economic and
social activity.”117  “We need employment.  Give us jobs and everything else
will take care of itself.  Jobs first.”118  With regard to education, the citizens
maintained: “Ghetto education is a sham.  Our kids learn nothing.  The
teachers are afraid and don’t try to help.  Our children are promoted to get rid
of them whether they’ve learned anything or not.”119  They, however, re-
served their harshest assessment for law enforcement: “The police brutalize
the Negro.  Many young Negroes get police records which ruin their chances
for employment.”120  “There is widespread fear and distrust: people of peo-
ple, police of people, and people of police.”121
The body of the Clark Report began with a description of the disturbing
nature of the community conditions in Watts and the surrounding South Los
Angeles area, all of which was predominately African-American.  Substan-
tial overcrowding was one major concern documented.  The population den-
sity for areas of Los Angeles outside of the riot curfew zone was 5,300
114 See, e.g., id. (“The white power structure wants us to stay in our place, to be kept in
poverty, in ghettos, uneducated, on relief.”); id. at 19 (noting that “[i]n virtually every con-
versation, strong feelings about police-community relations were registered”).
115 Roger Wilkins observed that: “Ramsey asked questions politely.  He wrote down what
people said.  He followed up their statements with probing questions.  He didn’t get flustered
by the rage.  It went on hour after hour.  He was never angry or self-righteous, never lost his
manners or his interest.” WILKINS, supra note 97, at 172. R
116 See id. at 173 (noting that “Andy Brimmer, Ramsey and I (Roger Wilkins) worked to
produce a report that would explain as fully as possible why Los Angeles had blown”); WOHL,
supra note 99, at 280 (noting that in describing his role in the drafting process, “Clark diplo- R
matically stated, ‘There were sections that I wrote, and there were sections that I rewrote.  I
spent many, many hours working with the people that were working directly on it.’”).
117 CLARK REPORT, supra note 12, at 20. R
118 Id. at 21.
119 Id. at 18.
120 Id. at 19.
121 Id.
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people per square mile.122  Within that zone, on the other hand, the density
figure spiked dramatically to 13,000 people per square mile, and increased
even further to 16,400 in Watts.123  This significant overpopulation served to
exacerbate the related issues of uneven housing, poor employment, inferior
education, and intense, widespread poverty.124
Tellingly, the most salient concerns addressed by the Clark Report were
those about which the people spoke most adamantly, namely employment,
education, and police-community relations.125  This toxic amalgam of social
ills engendered a paralyzing sense of isolation and hopelessness.  African-
American citizens of South Los Angeles were in a deep hole, with no appar-
ent way out and no one in power seemed to care.  The combative arrest of
the Fryes on that fateful August evening in 1965 was not the cause of the
riots, according to the Report; it merely served as the catalyst for a volcanic
reaction that had long been simmering beneath the surface.126
The Report recognized that addressing the employment concern was the
“most important and immediate task.”127  However, it also ominously ob-
served that “the high unemployment statistics and low income figures in
Watts and South Los Angeles areas tell only part of the story.”128  These
troubling numbers failed to capture the debilitating emotional effects of this
stark reality, especially on the psyche and motivation of black men.  Among
other things, the Report noted that the figures
do not tell of the frustration felt by able-bodied men who have
unsuccessfully sought employment time after time . . . .  [Nor do
they] tell of the destruction of the capability and the will to work
and the slow and difficult task of rehabilitation before men can
become productive.  And they do not tell of the social dynamite
locked inside the clusters of angry unemployed men seen on the
streets of the slum, day after day and night after night.129
Clark and his team acknowledged that multiple factors contributed to
the employment problem, including years of legally-sanctioned discrimina-
122 Id. at 6.
123 Id.
124 See id. at 8–13.
125 While these three items were arguably the most significant, the Clark Report examined
and made recommendations concerning nine separate issues that the Task Force deemed criti-
cal to addressing the underlying causes of urban unrest. See id. at 27–60; see also infra note
144.
126 See CLARK REPORT, supra note 12, at 50 (observing that the “arrests of August 11 were R
only the spark that ignited a highly combustible environment”); see also KERNER REPORT,
supra note 7, at 299 (maintaining that “[i]n Newark, in Detroit, in Watts, in Harlem — in R
practically every city that has experienced racial disruption since the summer of 1964 — abra-
sive relationships between police and Negroes and other minority groups have been a major
source of grievance, tension and, ultimately disorder”).
127 See CLARK REPORT, supra note 12, at 27. See also id. at 20 (noting that the “one R
theme that emerged in every conversation was the pressing need for jobs”).
128 Id. at 20.
129 Id. at 27.
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tion in education and job-related opportunities.130  Successfully addressing
the black employment concern would take far more than the mere enactment
of anti-discrimination legislation.  In the words of the Clark Report, solving
this and other similar problems would “require patient, determined, and
massive effort.”131  “The needs can be filled only by all-out effort of every
component of government — local, State and Federal; of every element of
nongovernmental group action; and of the individual citizens, particularly
those involved.”132
With regard to education, the Report maintained that “[it] is the door
through which the outsider can walk in.  It must be held wide open if we are
not to consign many in future generations to idleness, unproductiveness, and
perhaps destructiveness.”133  The employment and education problems went
hand-in-hand.  Without a true equalization of educational quality and oppor-
tunity, the employment crisis in Watts would never be solved.134  As Presi-
dent Johnson stated in his Howard address: “You do not take a person who,
for years, has been hobbled by chains and liberate him, bring him up to the
starting line of a race and then say, ‘you are free to compete with all the
others.’” 135
As in America today, allegations of racial profiling, harassment, and
overt brutality were common among members of the black community
against law enforcement in the 1960s.136  The Clark Report observed that
there was an unshakable perception that the police in South Los Angeles
viewed the black community as “hostile territory to be kept in check by a
continuous show of force.”137  Even when police did not engage in physical
abuse, blacks perceived that officers “were unnecessarily impolite and even
130 See id.
131 Id. at 24.
132 Id. at 3.
133 Id. at 31.
134 See id. (“[Education] is inextricably related both to employment and to the full in-
volvement of all of our people in all aspects of our life.  If many of the problems of urban
areas are to be alleviated, the exclusion of great numbers of our people from full participation
in American life must end.”).
135 See HOWARD ADDRESS, supra note 2. R
136 See CLARK REPORT, supra note 12, at 57 (observing that the “charge of police ‘brutal- R
ity’ is a dominant theme of conversation and editorial comment in the Negro community”); see
also KERNER REPORT, supra note 7, at 206 (maintaining that the “atmosphere of hostility and R
cynicism is reinforced by a widespread belief among Negroes in the existence of police brutal-
ity and corruption, and of  a ‘double standard’ of justice and protection — one for Negroes and
one for whites”). But see CLARK REPORT, supra note 12, at 58 (acknowledging that “a great R
many policemen . . . feel that they are being unjustly criticized because of their persistent
effort to suppress the high crime rates in the Negro community”).
137 CLARK REPORT, supra note 12, at 57. R
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insulting” in their day-to-day dealings.138  The ongoing antagonistic relation-
ship spawned an intense sense of mutual distrust and fear.139
Ramsey Clark believed that this reciprocal antipathy could be undone,
in part, through the establishment of a culture of “community policing” — a
concept that has attracted considerable renewed attention in recent years.140
It amounts to a change in focus by the police from pure law enforcement to
crime prevention and protection, and involves the creation of a feeling of
unity between citizens and the police.141  The appearance of a police officer
should connote safety and security, rather than evoking apprehension, dis-
dain, or rage.142  Similarly, the sight of a black youth should not automati-
cally arouse suspicion for law enforcement officials.143  Enhanced police-
community relations can break down stereotypes and foster an atmosphere
of trust and cooperation.
Employment woes, inferior education, and hostile police-community
relations, among other underlying problems,144 cultivated the pervasive and
devitalizing sense of alienation and isolation felt in South Los Angeles’s
black community, which the Task Force believed was at the heart of the
138 See id. at 58; see also id. at 57 (noting reports that contacts between the police and
members of the black community “are frequent and . . . believed to be unnecessarily
brusque”); KERNER REPORT, supra note 7, at 303 (observing that in addition to physical abuse, R
urban blacks were otherwise harassed without basis and subjected to “contemptuous and de-
grading verbal abuse”).
139 CLARK REPORT, supra note 12, at 57 (noting within the South Los Angeles area the R
existence of “reciprocal distrust and fear” between black citizens and the police); see also
KERNER REPORT, supra note 7, at 206 (contending that “to many Negroes police have come to R
symbolize white power, white racism and white repression.  And the fact is that many police
do reflect and express these white attitudes.”).
140 See generally FINAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY PO-
LICING (2015), http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforce_finalreport.pdf (last visited
Apr. 7, 2017).
141 See CLARK REPORT, supra note 12, at 59 (calling for police and other administrators to R
engage in “[f]requent contact with minority groups and young people in situations other than
investigation or arrest”); see also id. at 51 (recommending the development and implementa-
tion of “programs designed to provide broad and frequent social contact between citizens and
individual policemen, such as speaking assignments school activity participation, and civic and
social organization activity by the police”).
142 See, e.g., id. at 48 (suggesting the need for “[v]igorous, but humane and understanding
enforcement of the law in low income areas with a substantial deployment of uniformed Negro
officers to this task”); id. at 57 (maintaining that it is essential that “there be a mutual respect
between the police and the people of the slums”). See also RAMSEY CLARK, CRIME IN
AMERICA 154 (1970) (observing that the citizens of Watts “saw the police . . . not as their
protector but as their oppressor”).
143 See CLARK, supra note 142, at 159 (noting the critical importance of police developing
good relations with youth).
144 See CLARK REPORT, supra note 12, at 2 (observing that the “underlying causes of the R
riot are numerous, complex, and profound”).  Besides employment, education, and police-
community relations, other underlying problems that contributed to the riots and that were in
need of remedial attention included: (1) poor health and health care; (2) overcrowded and
substandard physical conditions in Watts and South Central Los Angeles; (3) lack of commu-
nication with black citizens and a failure to engage them in reform efforts; and (4) delinquency
and crime. See id. at 36–49.
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riots.145  Although the Clark Report in no way cast blame on the black re-
sidents of South Los Angeles for their precarious plight, it did emphasize
that they needed to play a major role in solving the various problems, taking
ownership of their situation, so as to best capitalize on any governmental
support provided from the outside.146  The Report wisely recognized that ex-
cluding citizens from the solution, as had been the case to date,147 would
render the problem unsolvable, as they alone fully understood what it felt
like to be in their shoes.148  Indeed, the riots themselves were palpable evi-
dence that reform efforts by the government and disconnected civil rights
leaders were doing little to alleviate the desperation felt within urban black
communities. Securing voting rights and dismantling legal segregation
meant virtually nothing to black citizens of Watts who could already vote
and were largely under- or unemployed, trapped in inferior de facto segre-
gated schools, brutalized by those charged with keeping them safe, and sub-
ject to abject poverty and societal indifference.149  Civil rights leaders
pointedly acknowledged that they may have missed the mark in their strat-
egy to achieve racial equality by not fully understanding or considering the
predicament of blacks in urban communities.150
Formally submitted to President Johnson on September 17, 1965, the
Clark Report tragically never went much further.
4. The Fate of the Clark Report
The Clark Report was a powerful, candid document that exposed pain-
ful realities about the condition of black citizens in Watts that were emblem-
atic of broader racial inequities throughout the nation.  It called for dramatic
145 See id. at 42 (observing that the “riot itself was in large part an expression of a deep
feeling of alienation”).
146 See id. at 25 (contending that the difficult task ahead “[could] be accomplished only
by the balanced and diligent effort of all our governments — local, state, and federal — of
labor and business, and by the involvement and concern of the people themselves”) (emphasis
added).
147 See id. at 42 (maintaining that “[t]o a very considerable degree, the people of the
poverty areas are non-participants and voiceless in community affairs”).
148 See id. at 43 (observing the African-American citizens’ deep sense of frustration seems
to have stemmed from the “belief that they [were] not included in the making of decisions
which affect[ed] their own future”); id. at 21 (“If people in the depressed areas can participate
in the planning and execution of welfare and poverty programs, they will be doing better.”).
149 See id. at 43.
150 See CARTER, supra note 2, at 60 (observing that “many civil rights leaders privately — R
and occasionally publicly — concluded that the rioting was an indictment of their own per-
sonal and organizational failures to reach out to a broader black constituency that would in-
clude the poorest of the poor in the cities of the North and West”).  Committee on Racial
Equality founder James Farmer stated: “Civil organizations have failed. . . .  No one had any
roots in the ghetto.” Id. Activist Bayard Rustin echoed this critique, proclaiming: “We must
hold ourselves responsible for not reaching them . . . .  We’ve done plenty to get votes in the
South and seats in the lunchrooms, but we’ve had no programs for these youngsters.” Id.
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and sustained action to remedy or at least alleviate these ills,151 and empha-
sized the necessity of treating the urban black poor with dignity and re-
spect.152  While pragmatic, the Report was optimistic and inspiring,
proposing unprecedented teamwork between elite leaders and African-
American working-class poor.  It likely offered the most realistic, albeit
challenging, recipe for successfully addressing the daunting problems that
plagued black Americans generally, but especially those in urban settings.
Notwithstanding its promise, President Johnson declined to release the Clark
Report publicly in light of “larger political concerns.”153  Though circulated
privately amongst a number of “permanent government” bureaucrats, copies
of the Report ultimately were vaulted away in an undated envelope, bearing
the clandestine and forbidding legend: “Confidential Reports which we have
announced have never been prepared.  Do not give out to anyone, or ac-
knowledge we have.”154  Various theories have been offered on what “larger
political concerns” led to this troubling decision to covertly suppress the
Report.
Ramsey Clark, for one, has maintained that the graphic, undiluted na-
ture of the Report caused its concealment.  It said things that the President
did not want publicized, especially not by the federal government.155  Harry
McPherson, President Johnson’s Special Assistant and Counsel, has sug-
gested that the President’s decision was an economic one.  The recommenda-
tions made in the Clark Report would have required the expenditure of
millions of dollars, and according to McPherson, “[t]he President was quite
dubious about the possibility of getting major social appropriations through
[Congress] in the aftermath of the riots.”156  Another proffered explanation
was that President Johnson did not want to step on the toes of the California
Commission that Governor Pat Brown had appointed to study the riots —
151 See CLARK REPORT, supra note 12, at 61 (maintaining that in addressing the problems R
unearthed in the Report, “America faces a challenge it will not be able to meet unless it has the
understanding, concern, initiative and action of all our government, of all our public and pri-
vate organizations, and of all our people”).
152 See id. at 56 (“the task of thinking of the minority poor as a vital and important part of
the national scene and treating them with the dignity and decency they deserve as people —
American people — must be mastered if we are to succeed in dealing with the problems”).
153 CARTER, supra note 2, at 172–73. R
154 Id. at 173.
155 Interview with Ramsey Clark, Former Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, in New
York, NY (January 6, 2016). See also Clark Oral History III, supra note 109, at 4 (noting that R
“the report didn’t pull any punches; it demonstrated the existence of really immensely difficult
problems . . .; it was not tender in its treatment of many important interests”); CARTER, supra
note 2, at 173 (suggesting that the Clark Report may have been suppressed because its “find- R
ings were so uncompromising in appraising the extent of problems in Los Angeles — and, by
extension, in other American cities — that [it] might . . . have been deemed too politically
sensitive by administration higher-ups and their political allies in southern California”).
156 Interview by T.H. Baker with Harry McPherson, in Washington, D.C. (Apr. 9, 1969),
https://www.discoverlbj.org/item/oh-mcphersonh-19690409-5-74-210-e, archived at https://
perma.cc/RF9Z-D5VX.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLC\52-2\HLC202.txt unknown Seq: 26  7-JUN-17 11:17
330 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 52
the McCone Commission, chaired by former CIA Director John McCone.157
That Commission would not complete its work until December of 1965,158
over three months after Clark submitted his Report.
Whatever the reason, the Report was never made public, and that was
disappointing and frustrating to Ramsey Clark.159  Although he provided a
copy to the McCone Commission as a resource in its examination of the
riots, that body failed to embrace and articulate the hopelessness and despair
of South Los Angeles in the authoritative, unadulterated manner of the Clark
Report.160  Admittedly, the McCone Report’s findings in terms of the causes
of the riots and recommendations for reform were similar; however, that
Report’s overall tenor was quite different from Clark’s,161 particularly with
regard to its moderate assessment of law enforcement’s contribution to the
climate that helped spawn the civil unrest.162  In fact, consistent with the
white majority’s law-and-order response to the riots, the McCone Report
largely praised the LAPD and singled out Chief William Parker, specifically,
for his efforts in such a difficult situation.163
III. AFTERMATH: MORE RIOTS, MORE REPORTS, MORE INACTION
Not surprisingly, more riots in major urban settings followed in the
succeeding years,164 the most devastating of which took place in Cleve-
land,165 Newark,166 and most destructively, Detroit.167  As a result of these
further disturbances, in July of 1967, President Johnson created the National
157 See HORNE, supra note 4, at 286 (observing that McCone had “thrown a fit” when he R
learned about the Task Force and threatened to resign as chair of Governor Brown’s Commis-
sion if that group’s report was published) (quoting WILKINS, supra note 97, at 173). R
158 See HORNE, supra note 4, at 343 (noting that the McCone Report, titled Violence in the R
City: An End or a Beginning?, was released in December of 1965).
159 See Clark Oral History III, supra note 109, at 4 (noting that it was a “continuing R
frustration to some of us, not to release [the Report]”).
160 See WOHL, supra note 99, at 281. R
161 See HORNE, supra note 4, at 343 (observing that the Report “made recommendations R
concerning the pressing issues — the LAPD, jobs, schools, etc. — but the points raised
seemed either overly cautious or obvious”); WOHL, supra note 99, at 281. R
162 See CARTER, supra note 2, at 173–74 (characterizing the findings of the McCone Re- R
port as “cautiously stated” and noting the harsh criticism directed at the Report by the South-
ern California Advisory Commission to the United States Commission on Civil Rights,
especially with regard to its positive portrayal of the LAPD and Chief Parker); FLAMM, supra
note 10, at 62–64 (discussing the conservative, cautious tone of the McCone Report and re- R
counting the widespread criticism to which it was subjected by liberals).
163 See supra note 162.
164 During the first nine months of 1967, 164 instances of civil unrest of varying degrees
of intensity were reported. See KERNER REPORT, supra note 7, at 113. R
165 See CARTER, supra note 2, at 201. R
166 See id. at 201–02 (discussing the Newark riots in which there were 26 deaths and
almost 1,500 injured).
167 See id. at 204–08 (noting that on the heels of the devastating Newark riots, rioting
erupted in Detroit that would lead to even greater individual harm and destruction, including
44 deaths, 351 serious injuries, and over 4,000 arrests); FLAMM, supra note 10, at 88–92 (dis- R
cussing the Detroit riots).
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Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (the Kerner Commission).168  The
President tasked the Commission principally with answering three straight-
forward but impossibly challenging questions regarding the riots: “What
happened? Why did it happen?  What can be done to prevent it from happen-
ing again?”169
In its chillingly ominous overall assessment, the Commission noted that
the “nation [was] moving toward two societies, one black, one white —
separate and unequal.”170  In addition, the Commission laid primary blame
for creation of the conditions that led to the riots on “white racism”: “Race
prejudice has shaped our history decisively; it now threatens to affect our
future.  White racism is essentially responsible for the explosive mixture
which has been accumulating in our cities since the end of World War II.”171
It went on to note that among the ingredients that comprised this mixture
were “[p]ervasive discrimination and segregation in employment, education
and housing, which have resulted in the continuing exclusion of great num-
bers of Negroes from the benefits of economic progress.”172
Although the Report’s Summary was perhaps its most dramatic and jar-
ring section, the remainder of the voluminous document carefully detailed
the evidence that supported such powerful pronouncements.  For example, it
provided a depressing synopsis of the evolution of race relations in America
from legalized slavery to Jim Crow to the de facto institutionalized segrega-
tion that widely existed at the time of the Report.173  This sharply illustrated
the lack of progress, notwithstanding various intermittent glimmers of hope
— the abolition of slavery,174 Reconstruction,175 Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion,176 and varying incantations of the civil rights movement,177 among
others.  According to the Report, frustrated hopes for racial progress com-
168 See CARTER, supra note 2, at 211. R
169 KERNER REPORT, supra note 7, at 1. R
170 Id.
171 Id. at 10.  The Report also stated: “What white Americans have never fully understood
but what the Negro can never forget — is that white society is deeply implicated in the ghetto.
White institutions created it, white institutions maintain it, and white society condones it.” Id.
at 2.
172 Id. at 10.  The other ingredients listed were specific variations of the discrimination and
segregation theme, and included:
Black in-migration and white exodus, which have produced the massive and grow-
ing concentrations of impoverished Negroes in our major cities, creating a growing
crisis of deteriorating facilities and services and unmet human needs.
The black ghettos where segregation and poverty converge on the young to de-
stroy opportunity and enforce failure.  Crime, drug addiction, dependency on wel-
fare, and bitterness and resentment against society in general and white society in
particular are the result.
Id.
173 See id. at 206–35.
174 See id. at 211–13.
175 See id. at 213–14.
176 See id. at 225–26.
177 See id. at 226–36.
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bined with persistent racial discrimination, as well as the perceived air of
legitimacy conferred upon violent acts of white terrorism and a general sense
of powerlessness within the black community, to create an atmosphere ripe
for civil unrest.178
In light of this combustible environment, all that was needed to set off
an explosion was a spark, typically supplied by law enforcement.  As the
Commission noted, “Almost invariably the incident that ignites disorder
arises from police action.  Harlem, Watts, Newark and Detroit — all the
major outbursts of recent years — were precipitated by routine arrests of
Negroes for minor offenses by white police.”179  There was a widespread
perception among blacks, particularly those in urban settings, that police
brutality against blacks was rampant.180  And the Commission recognized
that: “This belief [was] unquestionably one of the major reasons for intense
Negro resentment against the police.”181
Clearly, the Commission’s assessment was that the causes of the riots
were complex, longstanding, and deeply entrenched.  Fortunately, this bleak
diagnosis was not the end of the Report.  Rather, it went on to recognize that
its gloomy vision of an America heading toward two separate and unequal
societies was not inevitable, and could indeed be reversed with the realiza-
tion of “common opportunities for all within a single society.”182  As with
the Clark Report, the Kerner Report made plain just how difficult the task
ahead would be — the end goal could be achieved only through “compas-
sionate, massive and sustained [commitment], backed by the resources of
the most powerful and the richest nation on this earth.  From every American
it will require new attitudes, new understanding, and, above all, new will.”183
The Commission proclaimed: “[The programs proposed] will require un-
precedented levels of funding and performance, but they neither probe
deeper nor demand more than the problems which called them forth.  There
can be no higher priority for national action and no higher claim on the
nation’s conscience.”184
Echoing and reinforcing the “alienation” message of the Clark Report,
the Kerner Commission emphasized that “virtually every major episode of
violence was foreshadowed by an accumulation of unresolved grievances
and by widespread dissatisfaction among Negroes with the unwillingness or
178 See id. at 204–05; see also id. at 205 (“The frustrations of powerlessness have led
some to the conviction that there is no effective alternative to violence as a means of expres-
sion and redress, as a way of ‘moving the system.’”).
179 Id. at 206. See also CLARK, CRIME IN AMERICA supra note 142, at 144 (noting that
“[e]very major riot of the 1960’s prior to the widespread violence following the murder of
Martin Luther King arose from a police incident”).
180 See KERNER REPORT, supra note 7, at 302–04. R
181 Id. at 302.
182 See id. at 1.
183 Id. at 2.
184 Id.
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inability of local government to respond.”185  This persistent feeling of isola-
tion and unimportance stemmed from the same festering problems previ-
ously identified by Clark’s Task Force — unemployment, poor education and
living conditions, and antagonistic police-community relations.186  Unless
adequately addressed, these problems would continue to provide the fuel for
civil unrest and lead the nation down a path towards two permanently sepa-
rate Americas.
President Johnson was by no means pleased with the Kerner Report,
and consequently greeted it with little fanfare or gratitude.187  This seemed
chiefly attributable to the fact that the Commission, in his view, failed to
accord him appropriate praise for his strident efforts on the civil rights
front.188  Furthermore, the President felt that the Commission had left him
between a rock and a hard place by announcing sweeping recommendations
that were economically unrealistic.  The Commission frustratingly charged
him with what he believed to be an impossible task and he alone would have
to endure the fallout when the Report’s lofty proposals went unfulfilled.189
Perhaps most notably, Johnson seemed uncomfortable with the Commis-
sion’s pronouncement that “white racism” was at the heart of the riots.190
Although he could not deny that this played a role, he at least partially har-
bored the belief that rioters and looters were fundamentally
“lawbreakers.”191
There was no denying that there was an opportunistic, criminal element
present in all of the disturbances — there were those who viewed rioting
merely as a convenient excuse and cover for committing crimes.192  How-
185 Id. at 14.
186 See supra Section II.E.3.
187 See CARTER, supra note 2, at 227–31 (discussing Johnson’s “muted” and “lukewarm” R
reception to the Kerner Commission’s Report and his ultimate refusal to even issue obligatory
thank-you notes to Commission members for their service); FLAMM, supra note 10, at 108 R
(observing that “laying blame for the riots on white racism and . . . calling for billions of
dollars in additional aid to the cities . . . touched a raw nerve with the president,” resulting in
his refusal “to give the report even an insincere embrace or polite dismissal until it was too
late”).
188 See CARTER, supra note 2, at 230 (observing that Johnson “found it hard not to inter- R
pret the commission’s report as a 500-page personal insult, a failure to register proper recogni-
tion of his efforts in launching ‘his’ Great Society programs and winning civil rights
legislation”).
189 See id. at 228 (recounting President Johnson’s position that money was the real prob-
lem with the Commission’s Report because he felt it impossible to convince Congress to ap-
propriate the necessary funds given the budgetary battles he was already waging to preserve
his Great Society programs).
190 See id. at 232 (“I think probably, maybe the word racism, white racism [in the Kerner
Commission Report’s summary], frightened him.  He didn’t want to go down in history as the
president who had pointed his finger at his own people.”) (quoting Interview by Thomas H.
Baker with Roy Wilkins, Chairman, NAACP (Apr. 1, 1969), https://discoverlbj.org/item/oh-
wilkinsr-19690401-1-73-27).
191 See infra text accompanying note 217.
192 See STEVEN J. GOLD, THE STORE IN THE HOOD: A CENTURY OF ETHNIC BUSINESS AND
CONFLICT 107 (2010) (acknowledging theories that “the rioters were disaffected and marginal
youth or criminals” and that “looting was opportunistic”).
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ever, to dismiss the rioting out of hand on this basis, as many white con-
servative leaders did, was to self-interestedly gloss over the true nature of
the problems for black America in order to capitalize politically on the ex-
ploitation of white fear.  Consistent with this approach, there was also the
pervasive theory among the same group of leaders that black militants had
conspired to ignite the disturbances with the aid or inspiration of communist
agitators.193  To make matters worse, President Johnson himself could not
fully shake the political allure of being able to lay blame for the riots at the
feet of black radicals or communists.194  The President carefully endeavored
to walk the tightrope between acknowledgment of the underlying ills that he
well knew contributed to the riots and outright condemnation of the destruc-
tion and lawlessness.195  That, however, proved to be an unfeasible task, and
his clumsy efforts, combined with his ultimate refusal to embrace the Kerner
Report, may have served to further embolden those already committed to
characterizing the riots as a pure “law and order” issue.
IV. RISE OF THE POLITICS OF LAW AND ORDER
A. Evolution of the Appeal of Law and Order Politics
Although the earlier McCone Commission was criticized for its up-
braiding of the rioters and laudatory treatment of law enforcement,196 these
themes gained significant political traction, both locally and nationally.  The
Commission acknowledged the various urban problems that contributed to
the Watts riots, but emphasized that “agitators” or “riffraff” were instru-
mental in igniting and fanning the flames of unrest197 and defended the repu-
193 See CARTER, supra note 2, at 216 (noting that conservative law-and-order proponents R
“championed the idea that the riots could be brought under control if the loudest of the ‘agita-
tors’ who cried ‘burn, baby, burn’ were placed behind bars”); FLAMM, supra note 10, at 96–97 R
(observing that “[c]onservatives charged that the riots were criminal acts incited or exploited
by radical conspirators armed with revolutionary intent and aided or abetted by liberals whose
social programs had first instilled a sense of entitlement among the rioters and then rewarded
them for their lawlessness”).  In critiquing the conspiracy theorists, Ramsey Clark poignantly
observed: “The conspiracy theory provided the happiest answer: it implicated only a few evil
people we could all hate . . . .  Everything in our nature wanted to find a scapegoat.  Conspir-
acy alone could relieve us of a sense of national guilt.  The most unpleasant fact ignored, that
the ghetto is rampant with crime and that black rage is real.” CLARK, CRIME IN AMERICA,
supra note 142, at 168–69.
194 See infra note 220 and accompanying text; see also Jacki Lyden & Martha Wexler,
Maryland Town Recalls Racial Unrest in 1967, ALL THINGS CONSIDERED (Jul. 29, 2007), http:/
/www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=12420016, archived at https://perma.cc/
Q69F-HLDZ (noting that “Johnson believed outside agitators, even foreigners or communists,
must have been to blame for the rioting and arson that engulfed so many cities”).
195 See infra notes 216–19 and accompanying text; see also FLAMM, supra note 10, at 104 R
(recounting Special Counsel Harry McPherson’s dismay over how the White House’s practice
of issuing a statement strongly condemning the rioters followed by “an apologetic ‘Of course,
we understand why you rioted.’”).
196 See supra note 162.
197 See FLAMM, supra note 10, at 62. R
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tation and efforts of the LAPD.198  This mix of blaming the so-called
criminal, riffraff element and praising the police would become a popular
rhetorical formula for conservative politicians throughout the late 1960s.
Even before the Watts riots, Republican presidential nominee Barry
Goldwater mainstreamed the law and order approach by prominently inject-
ing it into his unsuccessful campaign against President Johnson.199  Goldwa-
ter, however, actually took the baton from Alabama Governor George
Wallace, who, in campaigning for the Democratic nomination, shamelessly
invoked law and order to arouse racist, anti-integration sentiments among
voters;200 and to a fairly significant degree, it worked.201  Although Goldwa-
ter did not want to be characterized as a racist, he recognized the appeal and
acknowledged the import of Wallace’s message.202  As a result, he endeav-
ored to highlight the same themes, but in a less overtly bigoted manner.  For
example, at the Republican National Convention in 1964, Goldwater
stressed the importance of law and order by striking a protectionist tone:
“security from domestic violence, no less than from foreign aggression, is
the most elementary and fundamental purpose of any government.”203  He
subsequently told a reporter that if elected, he would “do all I can to see that
women can go out in the streets of this country without being scared stiff.”204
Although Goldwater’s tactics demonstrated the potential appeal for a tough-
on-crime type campaign, Johnson was ultimately able to defuse this strategy,
in part, by coopting the Republican’s message.  Specifically, he recast his
administration’s “war on poverty” as a “war on crime” — “The war on
poverty . . . is a war against crime and a war against disorder.”205  Plainly,
the law and order platform had tapped into a viable vein within white
198 See id. at 63.
199 See ALEXANDER, supra note 15, at 42 (noting that Goldwater “aggressively exploited R
the riots and fears of black crime laying the foundation for the ‘get tough on crime’ movement
that would emerge years later”); FLAMM, supra note 10, at 30 (observing that Goldwater made R
law and order a central campaign theme in his challenge to Lyndon Johnson).
200 See FLAMM, supra note 10, at 34 (“As the physical embodiment of southern segrega- R
tion and ‘massive resistance’ to civil rights, Wallace clearly appealed to the anti-integration
sentiments of his northern audience.”).
201 See id. at 35 (noting that Wallace received a sizable percentage of the vote in various
primaries and “demonstrated how powerful the appeal of law and order was to those for whom
the threat of crime and disorder was real”).
202 See id. at 36.
203 Id. at 31.
204 Id. at 36.  It is important to note that the racial subtext of Goldwater’s message was
nonetheless readily apparent.  For example, by airing footage of the Harlem riots as illustrative
of the “break down of law and order.” Id. at 43–44.  Notably, NAACP Chair Roy Wilkins
charged that “every utterance touching on [law and order] by the Republican nominee and by
his vice presidential running mate has had ill-conceived racial overtones, undertones, and just
plain out-and-out tones.” Id.
205 Id. at 47. See also id. at 48 (observing that “[b]y avoiding issues where Goldwater
was strong (like law and order) and attacking those where he was weak (like Social Security
and nuclear war), Johnson protected his early lead and roared to a landslide victory”).
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America, and therefore was well-positioned to capture broader support in the
aftermath of the Watts riots and other instances of urban unrest.206
In the fall of 1965, President Johnson formally announced his “war on
crime” and embarked on a politically aggressive approach to battling crime
in America.207  The Watts riots, however, effectively derailed this attempt to
stem conservative appropriation of the law and order theme.  As Historian
Michael Flamm has observed, “Watts . . . exposed and exacerbated the racial
and ideological fissures that permeated the nation as it reached a fault line
between the optimism of the early 1960s and the pessimism of the late
1960s.”208  Conservatives were poised to capitalize on these divisions for
political gain, and in the coming years would unashamedly promote and ex-
ploit white fears of rampant urban violence and lawless black mobs.  They
touted more law and order as the comforter for these fears.
California gubernatorial candidate Ronald Reagan was one of the first
major politicians to successfully utilize law and order as a campaign theme
after Goldwater.  In what was perceived as a longshot challenge to Demo-
cratic incumbent Governor Pat Brown, Reagan combined his movie-star
charisma with a tough-on-crime message to handily capture the election.209
Though somewhat more subtle in his approach than Goldwater, Reagan nev-
ertheless deftly aroused fear among white Californians about black crime,
with such statements as “[e]very day the jungle draws a little closer.”210  He
also defended the so-called “white backlash” by characterizing it as “noth-
ing more than the concerns people have for  . . . extremists in the civil rights
movement taking to the streets, the use of violence, of demonstrations in-
stead of an orderly process of appealing wrongs through legitimate chan-
nels.”211  Further validating this point, Reagan vowed “not to tolerate
206 See id. at 49 (noting that, for a variety of reasons, the law-and-order approach failed in
1964, but it “energized a new generation of conservative activists . . . who at little political
cost could now appeal directly to southern whites opposed to black demands for civil rights”);
see also id. at 84 (“By the fall of 1967, restoring law and order meant repulsing urban riots.
Polls showed that the racial crisis was now the nation’s chief domestic concern.”).
207 See id. at 51.  Johnson proclaimed: “I will not be satisfied . . . until every woman and
child in this Nation can walk any street, enjoy any park, drive on any highway, and live in any
community at any time of the day or night without fear of being harmed.” Id.  Substantively,
he pushed through law enforcement-related legislation and established the Presidential Com-
mission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice (the so-called “Crime Com-
mission”) chaired by Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach. See id. at 52–58.
208 See id. at 52.
209 See id. at 68.
210 CARTER, supra note 2, at 218 (quoting Reagan).  Reagan also sought to arouse a ra- R
cially tinged backlash against welfare initiatives by Governor Brown and other liberals. See,
e.g., Cathleen Decker, Watts Riots Shifted State to the Right, but New Demographics Pushed It
Left, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/local/politics/la-me-pol-watts-polit-
ics-20150806-story.html, archived at https://perma.cc/F5W5-4EJT (quoting Reagan as saying
“four more years of reckless welfare spending and no change in a welfare system whose only
present purpose seems to be to perpetuate the dole and build a political machine”).
211 Id.
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individuals who broke the law under the guise of civil disobedience,” which
he said had no place in a democracy.212
Subsequent riots provided additional fodder for law and order enthusi-
asts.  Notably, Richard Nixon’s future Vice President Spiro Agnew, seized
upon law and order as governor of Maryland following a 1967 riot in Cam-
bridge that may have been at least encouraged by black power advocate H.
Rap Brown — then-Chair of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Commit-
tee (“SNCC”) — in a fiery speech, punctuated with an ominous ultimatum:
“If this town don’t come around, this town should be burned down.”213  Ag-
new was furious, expressing a desire to lock up Brown and throw away the
key.214  He also took a staunch law-and-order stance in response to the un-
rest, announcing that it would be the “policy of this state to immediately
arrest any person inciting to riot, and to not allow that person to finish his
vicious speech.”215
Although President Johnson understood the complex underlying
problems that fueled the widespread civil disorder, he could not resist the
political temptation to publicly trumpet his administration’s similar intoler-
ance for lawless activities of any kind and his personal commitment to “law
and order.”216  For example, on the heels of the 1967 Detroit riots, the Presi-
dent forcefully rebuked the rioters and committed to a stern national
response:
Pillage, looting, murder and arson have nothing to do with civil
rights.  They are criminal conduct. . . .  We will not tolerate law-
lessness. . . .  It matters not by whom it is done or under what
slogan or banner. . . .  This nation will do whatever is necessary to
do to suppress and to punish those who engage in it.217
To be sure, it was appropriate for President Johnson to condemn unlaw-
ful behavior, but to downplay the underlying hopelessness and desperation
that he accurately predicted could lead to such rebellions was hypocritical at
best and opportunistic at worst.218  No doubt mindful of the potential hypoc-
risy of piling on too heavily with the law-and-order rhetoric, the President
did soften his message somewhat in the ensuing days by acknowledging that
the well-known underlying conditions that led to “despair and violence” had
212 FLAMM, supra note 10, at 71. R
213 HARVARD SITKOFF, THE STRUGGLE FOR BLACK EQUALITY 1954-1992 203 (Rev. Ed.
1993) (quoting Brown).
214 See Lyden & Wexler, supra note 194. R
215 Id.
216 See, e.g., CARTER, supra note 2, at 207 (observing that in his speech following the R
Detroit riots, President Johnson employed the phrase “law and order” on numerous occasions).
217 Id. (quoting President Johnson’s Remarks to the Nation on Detroit Riots and Participa-
tion by Federal Troops, July 26, 1967).
218 Id. (maintaining that “those seeking some evidence that the president was willing to
acknowledge publicly the devastating conditions and police provocations that laid the ground-
work for urban unrest could draw little comfort from the address”).
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to be aggressively addressed, namely “ignorance, discrimination, slums,
poverty, disease, joblessness.”219  Privately, however, he continued to harbor
an optimistic belief that the riots were the product of a conspiracy by black
militants and he put intense pressure on his Attorney General Ramsey Clark
to validate this theory by bringing charges against Stokely Carmichael and
H. Rap Brown.220  Much to the President’s dismay, Clark steadfastly re-
fused,221 and thereby denied Johnson the political cover that he so desper-
ately sought.
B. Mainstream Acceptance of the Politics of Law and Order
and Rejection of Ramsey Clark
Throughout the lead-up to the 1968 elections, Republican candidates
exploited the urban civil unrest, overtly employing a law-and-order platform
and deftly playing on the fears of white voters.222  The Republican Coordi-
nating Committee unapologetically usurped the “civil rights” label to de-
scribe the effect that the rioting was having on law-abiding citizens — “The
most basic of civil rights is being denied to the American people,” the right
to be safe on the streets.223
In April of 1968, future Vice President Agnew enhanced his promi-
nence as a standard bearer for law and order with his reaction to riots that
broke out in Baltimore following the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr.
Although Agnew was appropriately respectful and remorseful about Dr.
King’s death, he could not contain his disdain for the looting and burning of
his state’s largest city.  He blamed black power incendiary Stokely Carmi-
chael for starting the riots and curbed suggestions that “an overwhelming
sense of frustration and despair” was the actual cause.224  Agnew further
lamented the breakdown of law and order in the face of such criminal behav-
ior, submitting that “law breaking has become a socially acceptable and oc-
casionally stylish form of dissent,”225 a fairly obvious and insensitive swipe
at the familiar civil rights tactic of civil disobedience.  Moreover, in a meet-
219 Id. at 212 (quoting President Johnson).
220 Id. at 215. See also Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., A Tale of Prosecutorial Indiscretion: Ram-
sey Clark and the Selective Non-Prosecution of Stokely Carmichael, 62 S.C. L. REV. 1, 20–22
(2010).
221 CARTER, supra note 2, at 215 (noting that “the new attorney general resisted substan- R
tial pressure from the White House, Congress, and public opinion to mount” such a case);
Brown, supra note 220, at 21–22. R
222 See FLAMM, supra note 10, at 82 (observing that during the summer of 1967, “riots in R
Newark and Detroit would further fan the fear — and doom the efforts of the White House to
regroup in preparation for 1968”); see also id. at 96 (“By the end of the ‘Long Hot Summer
[of 1967],’ the combustible combination of race, radicalism, and riots had exploded the liberal
faith that the War on Poverty would constitute a war on disorder.”).
223 See CARTER, supra note 2, at 209. R
224 JUSTIN P. COFFEY, SPIRO AGNEW AND THE RISE OF THE REPUBLICAN RIGHT 56 (2015).
225 KEVIN T. MCENEANEY, TOM WOLFE’S AMERICA: HEROES, PRANKSTERS, AND FOOLS 70
(2009) (quoting Arthur Schlesinger quoting Agnew).
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ing intended to ease tensions within the black community, Agnew made
things worse by denigrating black militants as “circuit riding, Hanoi visiting,
caterwauling, riot-inciting, burn-America down-type of leaders.”226  Such di-
atribes alienated him from Maryland’s African-American community, but
enhanced his appeal as a national leader of the right.227
One of the most notorious and visible invocations of the politics of law
and order likewise occurred shortly after the widespread rioting that erupted
in the wake of Dr. King’s assassination.  In response to the looting and burn-
ing in Chicago, Mayor Richard Daley, a Democrat, publicly stated that the
police “should have had instructions to shoot arsonists and looters — arson-
ists to kill and looters to maim and detain.”228  Attorney General Ramsey
Clark quickly denounced Daley’s position, and essentially threatened the
Mayor with personal prosecution if any looters were shot.  The likelihood of
civil unrest, especially by vocal opponents to the Vietnam War, loomed over
the upcoming Democratic National Convention planned for Chicago later
that summer.  As a result, there was reasonable concern that the police might
put Mayor Daley’s words into action within the next few months.  Clark, no
doubt, hoped to short-circuit this possibility.  He preferred a thoughtful,
measured approach to the civil unrest, recognizing that it emanated from
causes far more complex than mere lawlessness.
Although there was no shooting of looters or killing of arsonists, the
police put on a public display of brutality against anti-war protesters that
was unlike anything seen before in the north.  According to Norman Mailer’s
description, “The police attacked with tear gas, with Mace, and with clubs,
they attacked like a chain saw cutting into wood, the teeth of the saw the
edge of their clubs, they attacked like a scythe through grass, lines of 20 and
30 policemen striking out in an arc, their clubs beating, demonstrators
fleeing.”229
The majority of the public approved of Mayor Daley’s stance regarding
looters and arsonists and was sympathetic to the hardcore law-and-order ap-
proach employed by the Chicago police to keep the protesters in line.230  For
his attack on Daley and his preference for a more guarded, professional ap-
proach to quelling urban disturbances, Ramsey Clark was pilloried.  Sharply
critical letters poured into the Justice Department, expressing views such as:
“When a man of the stature of Mayor Daley . . . indicates that he is going to
226 CLINT HILL, FIVE PRESIDENTS: MY EXTRAORDINARY JOURNEY WITH EISENHOWER, KEN-
NEDY, JOHNSON, NIXON, AND FORD 328 (2016) (quoting Agnew).
227 See id. (noting that Agnew’s actions attracted the attention of the leadership of the
Republican Party and put him on the radar for his eventual selection as President Nixon’s
running mate).
228 FLAMM, supra note 10, at 155. R
229 Id. at 157 (quoting NORMAN MAILER, MIAMI AND THE SIEGE OF CHICAGO:  AN INFOR-
MAL HISTORY OF THE REPUBLICAN AND DEMOCRATIC CONVENTIONS OF 1968 (1969)).
230 See id. at 159 (noting that a “Gallup Poll reported that by a 56 to 31 percent margin
Americans approved of Daley’s actions [and a] Harris Poll showed that 66 percent of those
surveyed sided with Daley and the police”).
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try to preserve law and order, the Attorney General should have been the
first one to back him up.  But obviously, this Ramsey Clark does not believe
in law and order.”231
Clark was undeterred.  Based on Watts and other experiences, he had
come to view the principal source of black anger and dissatisfaction as
America’s police force.  The tension between law enforcement and the black
community was palpable, and instances of unfair treatment and displays of
excessive force against citizens of color did not seem exaggerated.
Clark believed that American law enforcement operated in a separatist,
paramilitary fashion, imposing law and order through force and intimida-
tion.232  He considered this to be an irrational strategy, observing that: “Po-
lice who act by force, violence, and cunning stamp the imprimatur of the
people on such practices, and leave those they seek to subjugate with little
alternative but to reply in kind.  In this way, by acting violently and crimi-
nally, the police are the cause of further crime and violence.”233
Consistent with his perspective on law and order, Clark did not hesitate
to prosecute officers who resorted to excessive force.  In 1968, Orangeburg,
South Carolina police opened fire on unarmed black students from South
Carolina State College who were protesting the local bowling alley’s refusal
to grant them access to the facility.234  Three students were killed and
twenty-seven others wounded, most in the back, indicating that the students
were fleeing when the shots were fired.235  This often-overlooked event,
known as the Orangeburg Massacre, infuriated Attorney General Clark.236
Despite the local government’s cover-up, as well as the strong likeli-
hood that a conviction would not be possible, Clark pursued the nine offend-
ing police officers on the charge of “impos[ing] summary punishment”
without due process of law.237  Although they were ultimately acquitted,
Clark had no regrets about the prosecution.  He was content with the mes-
sage his action sent, firmly believing that “[f]rom a law enforcement stand-
point, [the case] would have a sobering, stabilizing effect.”238
The prospect of inspiring caution in the face of similar public safety
challenges in the future was ample prosecutorial motivation for Clark.  In
addition, he laid definitive blame for the tragedy at the feet of the govern-
ment and the American public for “our failure to right grievous wrongs,
231 Constituent Letter, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Personal Papers of Ramsey Clark,
Box 68, “Letters Re: Riots & Shooting of Looters.”
232 See Ramsey Clark, Police That Serve Society, in THE GREAT IDEAS TODAY 9–11 (Rob-
ert M. Hutchins, et al. eds., 1972) (characterizing American police as paramilitary in nature).
233 Id. at 5–6.
234 See JACK BASS & JACK NELSON, ORANGEBURG MASSACRE 65–77 (1970).
235 See id at 76–137.
236 See id. at 168–172; see also Frank Beacham, Orangeburg, America’s Forgotten Trag-
edy, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 5, 1993), http://articles.latimes.com/1993-02-05/local/me-797_1_civil-
rights, archived at https://perma.cc/D45T-33BK (noting that Clark was determined to uncover
the truth of the tragedy and “mounted a federal investigation”).
237 BASS & NELSON, supra note 234, at 180.
238 See id. at 101, 180.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLC\52-2\HLC202.txt unknown Seq: 37  7-JUN-17 11:17
2017] Different Lyrics, Same Song 341
permitting conditions to arise and continue where tens of thousands of black
Americans were deprived of constitutional and statutory rights — and really
their opportunity for personal fulfillment in our society.”239  This echoes of
what he had articulated in his Watts Report three years earlier.
For positions like this, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover labeled Clark a
“jellyfish,”240 and presidential candidates Richard Nixon and George Wal-
lace even more damningly sullied him as being “soft on crime.”241  In fact,
the centerpiece of future President Nixon’s successful campaign was the ex-
ploitation of the white majority’s fears regarding black militants, rioting, and
urban crime in general242 — the so-called Southern strategy243 — and he
repeatedly proclaimed to the American public that: “If we are to restore
order and respect for law in this country, there’s one place we’re going to . . .
begin.  We’re going to have a new Attorney General of the United States.”244
The even more extreme and racially tinged law-and-order stance that third-
party candidate Wallace staked out rallied a substantial voting bloc, which
likely aided Nixon’s eventual victory.245  For example, following the unrest
in Chicago, Wallace took Mayor Daley’s rhetoric to another level, proclaim-
ing: “We don’t have riots in Alabama. . . .  They start a riot down there, first
one of ‘em to pick up a brick gets a bullet in the brain, that’s all.  And then
you walk over to the next one and say, ‘All right, pick up a brick.  We just
239 BASS & NELSON, supra note 234, at 226.
240 CURT GENTRY, J. EDGAR HOOVER: THE MAN AND HIS SECRETS 598, 601 (1991).
241 See, e.g., Peter Carlson, The Crusader, WASH. POST (Dec. 15, 2002), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/archive/lifestyle/2002/12/15/the-crusader/9de49dd7-43fd-45e0-a4ef-
3df4475cb4a0, archived at https://perma.cc/6ZZ8-4V8B (observing that on the campaign trail
Nixon promised “at every whistle-stop to fire Clark and hire somebody who’d crack down on
crime”); John B. Judis, The Strange Case of Ramsey Clark, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 22, 1991, at
23, 27–28 (noting that Nixon “singled out Clark . . . for undermining ‘law and order’ in the
country”).
242 See RICHARD HARRIS, JUSTICE: THE CRISIS OF LAW, ORDER AND FREEDOM IN AMERICA
144 (1970) (observing that during his campaign, “Nixon repeatedly implied in the North that
he would crack down on those who fomented disorder and those who committed crimes . . .
and he repeatedly implied in the South that he would slow down the pace of integration”).
243 See ALEXANDER, supra note 15, at 44 (explaining that the “success of law and order
rhetoric among working-class whites and the intense resentment of racial reforms, particularly
in the South, led conservative Republican analysts to believe that a ‘new majority’ could be
created by the Republican party, one that included the traditional Republican base, the white
South, and half the Catholic, blue-collar vote of the big cities”).
244 HARRIS, supra note 242, at 14.
245 See FLAMM, supra note 10, at 167.  Whereas Nixon was somewhat circumspect in R
terms of making direct racially-charged appeals, Wallace was not, saying such things as,
“Race mixing doesn’t work.  Show me a place where it’s worked.” Id. at 165.  Nixon was able
to portray himself as a more palatable version of Wallace by not denouncing Wallace’s mes-
sage, while at the same time making similar points in a less caustic manner. See id. at 165.  He
was thus able to attract Democrats who might have otherwise voted for Wallace, while Wallace
still attracted a good number of hardcore, disgruntled Democrats away from their party’s nomi-
nee.  This likely led to Nixon’s narrow victory. But see id. at 167 (maintaining that even if
Wallace had not been in the race, Nixon may have still won).
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want to see you pick up one of them bricks, now!”246  His plan for dealing
with any future riots would be to shoot first and ask questions later.247
Although many rejected such a harsh posture, enough voters gravitated
towards Wallace’s message and Nixon’s less confrontational version to force
mild-mannered Democratic nominee Hubert Humphrey to reluctantly join in
the law-and-order fray, albeit to a small and ambivalent extent.248  In fact,
because of the effective job that Nixon did of portraying Ramsey Clark as
being “soft on crime” and blameworthy for the breakdown in law and order,
Humphrey, like Nixon, promised that he too would have a different Attorney
General if elected.249
It is noteworthy that although Clark, for the most part, kept to himself
during the campaign, on at least one occasion he could not endure Nixon’s
distortion of the reality of crime in America and his accompanying calls for
more law and order.  Clark felt compelled to respond with an insightful and
moving rebuke, which is equally as relevant and poignant in today’s political
climate:
Politicians can lead or follow. . . .  They can appeal to the best in
people or to the worst.  They can divide, brutalize, and mislead, or
they can unite, humanize, and give confidence. . . .  What of
crime?  How is it controlled and reduced? . . .  Not by exhortations
to “law and order,” which may mean many things but to most
today signify force, order as an end in itself, repressiveness.  It
nurtures fear by conjuring terrible crimes.  It fires anger by imply-
ing authoritarian power.  It divides black from white, young from
old, rich from poor, educated from ignorant. . . .  It somehow calls
for force to prevent the act of crime while ignoring the heart pre-
pared to commit it.250
In the end, Nixon and “law and order” prevailed, and Clark, as prom-
ised, exited the Department of Justice in January of 1969.  Unfortunately,
with his departure, so went much of the hope that existed for seriously en-
deavoring to solve the racial ills that had been central to the civil unrest over
the preceding three years.
President Nixon, John Mitchell (Clark’s successor as Attorney General),
and FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover continued to fan the flames of white fear
of black lawlessness for political gain, most infamously through Hoover’s
proclamation of the Black Panther Party as the “greatest threat to the inter-
nal security of the country [among] violence-prone black-extremist
246 Id. at 164.
247 See id.
248 See id. at 168–73 (discussing Humphrey’s awkward efforts to appear more strident on
law and order, while not discarding his core beliefs in justice, fairness, and eradication of
poverty).
249 See id. at 172.
250 HARRIS, supra note 242, at 28–29 (quoting Clark).
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groups.”251  To control this threat and other similar ones, America, of course,
needed more law and order, according to the Nixon administration.  The
Clark Report had taken note of the new radical leadership that had been
emerging within the civil rights movement and warned of the necessity of
working with and learning to understand their perspective.252  Attempting to
listen to and engage the Black Panther Party and other militant voices, how-
ever, was never an option that was seriously considered by Nixon, Mitchell,
or Hoover.
C. More Unrest, More Calls for Law and Order,
More Avoidance of the Issue
Subsequent administrations have differed in their approaches, but al-
most invariably, the law-and-order refrain has remained a viable political
reprise to perceptions of black lawlessness, whether in the form of rioting,
street violence, or drug-related crime.253  In 1992, after Rodney King’s brutal
beating at the hands of the LAPD was famously captured on video for the
entire world to see,254 and the officers were later acquitted of criminal
charges, Watts-like rioting erupted across South Los Angeles.255  Citizens of
color rioted out of desperation, frustration, and anger because after twenty-
seven years it seemed that little had changed in terms of how they were
viewed in the eyes of the law — the King verdict painfully reaffirmed a
widespread sense of hopelessness, insignificance, and despair256 that once
more fueled a “destructive rebellion against the fabric of society.”257
251 ROY WILKINS & RAMSEY CLARK, SEARCH AND DESTROY: A REPORT BY THE COMMIS-
SION OF INQUIRY INTO THE BLACK PANTHERS AND THE POLICE 11 (1973) (quoting Hoover).
252 See CLARK REPORT, supra note 12, at 44 (“It is a matter of greatest importance that R
these new leaders be understood, because increasingly it is through them that the restive mi-
norities in our major cities will be reached.”).
253 See, e.g., FLAMM, supra note 10, at 182–84 (recounting President George H. W. Bush’s R
use of the infamous Willie Horton ad to make the point that his Democratic challenger was
soft on crime and President Bill Clinton’s hardline efforts to convince American voters that he
was tough on crime); supra note 17. R
254 See HORNE, supra note 4, at 355 (recounting the brutal beating of Rodney King — an R
African-American motorist — by LAPD officers following a high-speed chase, which was
captured on videotape and widely broadcasted thereafter).
255 See HORNE, supra note 4, at 355 (noting that following the acquittal of the police R
officers, the “city again exploded”).  The mayhem and damage that accompanied the 1992
L.A. riots far exceeded that of Watts: more than 16,000 were arrested; 2,383 were injured; 52
died; and property damage was in the vicinity of $1 billion. See id. at 355–56.  In 1980,
similar unrest occurred in Miami, Florida in the Liberty City area, when four police officers
were acquitted of manslaughter charges for the killing of a black motorist, Arthur McDuffie,
after a high-speed chase. See David Smiley, McDuffie Riots: Revisiting, Retelling Story — 35
Years Later, MIAMI HER. (May 16, 2016), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/commu-
nity/miami-dade/article21178995.html, archived at https://perma.cc/DEX5-RXE4.
256 See, e.g., HORNE, supra note 4, at 358 (observing that “[o]nce again, the LAPD’s R
treatment of blacks had deepened old wounds”).
257 Supra note 2. R
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As in 1965, prominent leaders were quick to focus upon and condemn
the looting, burning, and violence.258 They could not or would not look past
the superficial mayhem, focusing instead on black and brown lawlessness,259
and thus again failed to comprehend the message behind the rioting.  And, as
in 1965, another commission was formed, this time to specifically investi-
gate the LAPD, with former McCone Commission member Warren Christo-
pher as its chair.260  Interestingly, one of the main recommendations of the
Christopher Commission was a call for the establishment of “community
policing,”261 a proposal central to the Clark Report.262
Multiple incidents over the twenty-four years since the Rodney King
riots have exposed the continuing presence of social ills that fueled the civil
unrest in Watts over fifty years ago.263  Perhaps the most striking and de-
pressing parallel, however, can be gleaned from the contemporary events in
Ferguson, Missouri, spurred primarily by yet another tragic encounter be-
tween law enforcement and the black community.  The following section
will provide some background on what led to Ferguson’s replaying of the
Watts’ tune in 2014, and then examine the public’s reaction and the federal
government’s response, both of which were eerily redolent of 1965.
V. THE FERGUSON RIOTS OF 2014
A. The Shooting of Michael Brown
As with the Watts riots, the precipitating event for the civil unrest in
Ferguson, Missouri in 2014 was an encounter between a police officer and
an African-American citizen.  In addition, like the Fryes’ confrontation with
Officer Minikus and the California Highway Patrol, accounts of the details
surrounding what actually transpired on that fateful day in August of 2014
vary widely.  Some contend that Michael Brown was never the aggressor
and in fact submissively had his hands up at the time that Officer Darren
258 See, e.g., Ronald Brownstein, Buchanan Links L.A. Riots to Immigration Problems,
L.A. TIMES (May 14, 1992), http://articles.latimes.com/1992-05-14/local/me-3227_1_illegal-
immigrant, archived at https://perma.cc/BNH6-UT5K (noting Republican Presidential candi-
date Pat Buchanan’s expressed view that illegal immigrants were largely responsible for the
rioting and his position that America should build a fence between it and Mexican border to
stop illegal immigration); Karen Hosler,  Bush Hopes Riots Spark Concern for Law and Order,
BALT. SUN (May 6, 1992), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1992-05-06/news/1992127128_1_
urban-problems-law-and-order-riot-zone, archived at https://perma.cc/764F-Q2BB (suggesting
that President Bush began to play on the “racial anxieties of white voters” following the L.A.
riots, expressing his intention to prosecute those “who murdered, burned and looted”).
259 A large Latino contingent participated in the 1992 riots. See HORNE, supra note 4, at R
356.
260 See id. at 358.
261 See id.
262 See supra notes 140–43 and accompanying text.
263 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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Wilson fatally shot him,264 spawning the widespread adoption of the protest
slogan, “Hands Up. Don’t Shoot!”265  Others maintain that Brown became
aggressive when stopped by Officer Wilson, and that Wilson’s deadly re-
sponse was in self defense.266  The truth is likely somewhere in between and
will never be fully known.
The facts that cannot reasonably be disputed, however, are that Brown
and a companion were walking eastbound down the middle of Canfield
Drive when Officer Wilson, from his patrol car, stopped the two men.267
There was an apparent struggle through the driver’s side window of Wilson’s
vehicle between Brown and Wilson, though it is not entirely clear who initi-
ated it.268  During the struggle, Brown was shot in the hand; he then retreated
down the street and Wilson ran after him.269  Following a brief chase, Wilson
shot Brown multiple times.  Witnesses’ claims that Brown was shot in the
back have been discredited by the physical evidence, but there is no denying
that Brown was unarmed and was gunned down by Officer Wilson while
residents of the neighborhood watched.270
Although the shooting angered onlookers and resulted in chants encour-
aging retaliation — “we need to kill these motherf—-ers”271 — the neigh-
borhood did not erupt in the same manner as Watts.  Nonetheless, numerous
citizens expressed outrage, both locally and nationally, and riot-like behavior
occurred in the streets of Ferguson — looting and angry protesting.272  After
a controversial display of military-style police force,273 relative calm was
264 See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE REPORT REGARDING THE CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATION INTO THE SHOOTING DEATH OF MICHAEL BROWN BY FERGUSON, MISSOURI PO-
LICE OFFICER DARREN WILSON 8, 32, 49 (Mar. 4, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/
files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/doj_report_on_shooting_of_michael_brown_1
.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/XU3K-M29E [hereinafter WILSON REPORT] (concluding
that the accuracy of testimony to the effect that Brown had his hands up could not be con-
firmed); see also Michelle Ye Hee Lee, “Hands Up, Don’t Shoot” Did Not Happen in Fergu-
son, WASH. POST (Mar. 19, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/
2015/03/19/hands-up-dont-shoot-did-not-happen-in-ferguson, archived at https://perma.cc/
47A5-4G7K.
265 See id.
266 See id.
267 See WILSON REPORT, supra note 264, at 6.
268 Wilson claims that when he tried to open his car door, Brown shoved it closed and then
punched him the face.  Wilson then alleges that he reached for his gun and Brown tried to take
it from him.  At this point, Wilson contends that he shot Brown in the hand. See id. at 6.  The
DOJ was unable to corroborate Wilson’s account of the struggle over the gun with eyewitness
testimony, but no credible evidence was uncovered that could refute his story either. See id. at
7.
269 See id. at 6.
270 See id. at 7.
271 Id. at 8.
272 See Lindsey Bever, Police Killing Prompts Rioting, Looting Near St. Louis, WASH.
POST (Aug. 11, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/08/11/
police-killing-prompts-rioting-looting-near-st-louis/, archived at https://perma.cc/VYD4-
ZRW8.
273 See infra note 286 and accompanying text.
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restored to the area, but peaceful protests continued, typically headlined by
the mantra “black lives matter.”274
Ferguson remained tense, but superficially subdued in the ensuing
months, that is, until the announcement of the grand jury’s decision not to
indict Officer Wilson on criminal charges.
B. The Grand Jury Decision
Many within the Ferguson community and throughout the nation were
cautiously optimistic that Darren Wilson would be indicted for the killing of
Michael Brown, and anxiously awaited the grand jury’s decision.  On No-
vember 24, 2014, District Attorney Robert McCulloch announced that the
grand jury declined to indict Officer Wilson on any charges.275  While from a
substantive, evidentiary standpoint, that result may have been defensible, the
optics of the situation were troublesome.
First, the D.A.’s decision to remain involved in the grand jury investiga-
tion was of great concern, in part, because of the inherent conflict of interest
that exists when local prosecutors consider possible criminal charges against
officers with whom they necessarily work closely.276  This innate conflict,
however, was exacerbated by the fact that McCulloch’s father was a police
officer who had been killed in the line of duty.277  In addition, the longstand-
ing history of law enforcement’s violence against African-Americans going
mainly unchecked, could not be ignored.  Lastly, and most importantly, the
toxic culture of mistrust and fear that permeated the relationship between
black citizens of Ferguson and the Ferguson Police Department (“FPD”),278
274 “Black Lives Matter” is a movement that began after George Zimmerman’s acquittal
for the shooting death of unarmed black teenager Trayvon Martin, which occurred in Sanford,
Florida in 2012. See Jonathan Capehart, From Trayvon Martin to “Black Lives Matter,”
WASH. POST (Feb. 27, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/wp/2015/
02/27/from-trayvon-martin-to-black-lives-matter/, archived at https://perma.cc/GK27-TTFG.
275 See Chico Harlan, Wesley Lowery & Kimberly Kindy, Ferguson Police Officer Won’t
Be Charged in Fatal Shooting, WASH. POST (Nov. 25, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/politics/grand-jury-reaches-decision-in-case-of-ferguson-officer/2014/11/24/de48e7e4-
71d7-11e4-893f-86bd390a3340_story.html, archived at https://perma.cc/ZR6A-QSTF (dis-
cussing the grand jury’s decision and the chaos that ensued after the announcement).
276 See Kate Levine, Who Shouldn’t Prosecute the Police, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1447, 1447
(2016).
277 See Kate Levine, The Ultimate Conflict: Local Prosecutors Should Not Decide
Whether to Criminally Charge Police Officers Like Ferguson’s Darren Wilson, SLATE (Sept.
11, 2014), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/09/local_prose
cutor_bob_mcculloch_should_not_be_the_one_to_decide_whether_to.html, archived at https:/
/perma.cc/MLB9-QY8C.
278 See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 2 (Mar.
4, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/
04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf [hereinafter FPD REPORT]  (observing that “Fergu-
son’s police department and municipal court practices have sown deep mistrust between parts
of the community and the police department, undermining law enforcement legitimacy among
African Americans in particular”).
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLC\52-2\HLC202.txt unknown Seq: 43  7-JUN-17 11:17
2017] Different Lyrics, Same Song 347
as in Watts forty-nine years earlier, appears to have been the fuel ignited by
the grand jury’s sparks.
C. Burn, Baby, Burn! — Part 2
Following Robert McCullough’s announcement that Officer Wilson
would not be charged, Michael Brown’s stepfather, Louis Head, angrily
shouted to a crowd of protesters: “Burn this motherf—-er down! . . .  Burn
this bitch down!”279  Although it is not possible to directly link the burning,
looting, and violence that later ensued to Mr. Head’s comments,280 his in-
flammatory rhetoric certainly did nothing to curtail it and harkened back to
the Watts riots’ rallying cry of “burn, baby, burn!”281  Throughout the night
of November 24 and into the next day, fires were set, stores looted, gunshots
heard, and bricks hurled.282  The damage, injuries, and arrests paled in com-
parison to the Watts riots and other instances of civil disturbance in the late
1960s, but the parallels were nonetheless dramatic.283
While the white public’s response was not nearly as vitriolic and con-
demning as that related to Watts, there were familiar calls for more law and
order, finger-pointing at the black community for demonstrating a lack of
personal responsibility,284 and defensive praise of police officers for the hard
work they perform.  Notably, however, the law-and-order refrain was by no
means uniform from conservatives.  A number of high-profile Republican
leaders broke rank and seemed to side with the protesters, especially con-
cerning the harsh police response to the unrest.285  For example, Republican
Senator Rand Paul, after the rioting in the immediate aftermath of Brown’s
279 Ray Sanchez, Michael Brown’s Stepfather at Rally: “Burn This Bitch Down!”, CNN
(Dec. 8, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/11/25/us/michael-brown-stepfather-video/, archived
at https://perma.cc/EE5X-JZVE.
280 See Sarah Larimer, Stepfather of Michael Brown Apologizes for Rant After Grand Jury
Announcement, WASH. POST (Dec. 3, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-na
tion/wp/2014/12/03/stepfather-of-michael-brown-apologizes-for-rant-after-grand-jury-an-
nouncement/?utm_term=.ac277a6eb624, archived at https://perma.cc/KZ78-86DX (noting
Louis Head’s apology for his rashness and disclaiming of any responsibility for the unrest that
followed, attributing that largely to the state’s militaristic preparation for possible unrest).
281 See supra Part II. B. Cf. supra text accompanying note 213.
282 See Yamiche Alcindor, et al., Ferguson Burning After Grand Jury Announcement, USA
TODAY (Nov. 25, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/11/24/ferguson-
grand-jury-deliberations/19474907/, archived at https://perma.cc/SJ9D-M965.
283 See, e.g., Chuck Henson, Reflections on Ferguson: What’s Wrong with Black People?,
80 MO. L. REV. 1013, 1013–14 (2015), (observing parallels between 1967 riots in Newark and
Detroit and Ferguson).
284 See FPD REPORT, supra note 278, at 5 (observing that Ferguson “officials have fre-
quently asserted that the harsh and disparate results of [its] law enforcement system do not
indicate problems with police or court practices, but instead reflect a pervasive lack of ‘per-
sonal responsibility’ among certain segments of the community”).
285 See Jonathan Martin & Ashley Parker, Law and Order Issues, Once G.O.P.’s Strength,
Now Divide the Party, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 24, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/25/us/
politics/law-and-order-issues-once-gops-strong-suit-now-divide-party.html, archived at https://
perma.cc/C2YG-JG8F (noting that some Republican leaders have taken a softer stance on
stressing “law and order” in light of recent police shootings of unarmed black men).
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shooting, wrote that: “There should be a difference between a police re-
sponse and a military response.  The images and scenes we continue to see
in Ferguson resemble war more than traditional police action.”286
Such sympathetic responses, though, may have been politically in-
spired, designed to curry favor with groups that now represent a very sizable
potential voting bloc.  In addition, given the decline in crime statistics in
recent years, it is now less risky to take a position that bucks the law-and-
order mainstream.287
Nevertheless, there were many who still vigorously embraced the polit-
ics of law and order, and their number and volume has increased over the
two years since the initial Ferguson rioting, engendered by more police
shootings and more violent responses.  For instance, after the Baltimore riots
— which occurred in response to the April 2015 death of Freddie Gray while
in the custody of the Baltimore police288 — condemnation of the burners and
looters was fierce and unapologetic.  Though most acknowledged the troub-
ling circumstances surrounding Gray’s death, they expressed no tolerance
whatsoever for the violent community reaction that ensued and sternly con-
demned the lack of respect for law and order.  Then-Republican presidential
hopeful Ben Carson lamented the inanity of rioting and called upon parents
to take control of their children and “not allow them to be exposed to the
dangers of uncontrolled agitators on the streets.”289 Even President Obama
had strong words for the rioters: “There is no excuse for that kind of vio-
lence . . . . It’s counterproductive. . . .  They’re not protesting.  They’re not
making a statement . . . .  They’re stealing . . . they’re committing arson.”290
And as time has passed, leaders have progressively moved towards
making direct appeals for the restoration of law and order. They have also
switched the focus of the narrative somewhat to defense of law enforcement,
aided by acts of violence senselessly carried out against random police of-
286 Jeremy W. Peters, Missouri Unrest Leaves the Right Torn Over Views on Law vs. Or-
der, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/15/us/politics/seeing-mis
souri-unrest-views-begin-to-shift-among-conservatives.html, archived at https://perma.cc/
L6ZV-G6E2; see also Peter Beinart, This Time It’s Different: The Conservative Response to
Ferguson, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 14, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/
08/this-time-its-different-the-conservative-response-to-ferguson/378546/, archived at https://
perma.cc/6UAM-5CGL.
287 See id. (observing that it is now possible to safely express skepticism regarding
hardline law-and-order policies because of the decline in crime).
288 See Tom Foreman Jr. & Amanda Lee Myers, Baltimore Hit by Riots; National Guard is
Called In, BOST. GLOBE (Apr. 27, 2015), https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2015/04/
27/baltimore-officers-hurt-mall-riot-police-say/gu2meSJ03xADrNHBTumA1I/story.html,
archived at https://perma.cc/VG47-LA3J (discussing the looting, burning, and brick throwing
that erupted in Baltimore after the funeral for Freddie Gray).
289 Ben Carson, Dr. Ben Carson: Baltimore Rioting Is “Truly Senseless,” TIME (Apr. 28,
2015), http://time.com/3838868/ben-carson-baltimore-riots/, archived at https://perma.cc/
DS6R-TT3Q.
290 Maya Rhodan, President Obama Says There Is ‘No Excuse’ for Violence in Baltimore,
TIME (Apr. 28, 2015), http://time.com/3838611/president-obama-baltimore-riots-violence/,
archived at https://perma.cc/G2BK-VECT.
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ficers in retaliation for shootings of black men.291  In September of 2015,
Texas Congressman Roger Williams delivered a speech from the floor of the
U.S. House of Representatives that harkened back to those made by con-
servative Southern legislators in the wake of the Watts riots:292
We find ourselves asking: When will the rule of law and
those who enforce that law, once again, be respected?  How many
more violent protests and threatening chants will those who
bravely wear the badge have to put up with?  How much more
taunting under the guise of a misleading slogan [“black lives mat-
ter”] be [sic] tolerated before community organizers, prominent
African American leaders, and democrats at the city, State, and
national levels say enough is enough?  When will we hear, in uni-
son: “It is not okay to kill police officers?”
Mr. Speaker, my colleagues and I are here this evening . . . to
call for the restoration of law and order.  We are here to call for the
protection of the men and women who put their lives on the line
every single day — the ones who chose a profession to help make
their neighborhoods safer. . . .  Mr. Speaker, their lives matter, too,
and all lives matter.293
More recently, following the deaths of Alton Sterling in Louisiana and
Philando Castile in Minnesota, and the vengeful shootings of Dallas and
Louisiana police officers, the politics of law and order squarely reclaimed
center stage.  On July 11, 2016, then-Republican presidential nominee Don-
ald Trump ripped a page directly out of Richard Nixon’s playbook by declar-
ing himself the “law and order candidate,” maintaining that: “We must
maintain law and order at the highest level, or we will cease to have a coun-
try, 100 percent. . . .  Or we will cease to have a country.”294
291 See, e.g., Manny Fernandez, et al., Five Dallas Officers Were Killed as Payback, Police
Chief Says, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/09/us/dallas-police-
shooting.html, archived at https://perma.cc/J2V5-FRHZ  (observing that the Dallas shooting
“was the kind of retaliatory violence that people have feared through two years of protests
around the country against deaths in police custody”).
292 See supra text accompanying notes 85–87.
293 114 CONG. REC. H5808 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2015) (statement of Rep. Williams).
294 Wilkie, supra note 20. See also Michael Barbaro & Alexander Burns, It’s Donald
Trump’s Convention. But the Inspiration? Nixon., N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2016), http://www
.nytimes.com/2016/07/19/us/politics/donald-trump-portrayed-as-an-heir-to-richard-nixon.html,
archived at https://perma.cc/AM5J-G85R (noting the undeniable similarities between Trump’s
campaign rhetoric and that of Richard Nixon in 1968). Following President Trump’s victory,
concerns were voiced regarding the prospect of a return to an emphasis on “law and order.”
See, e.g., Yamiche Alcindor, Minorities Worry What a “Law and Order” Donald Trump Presi-
dency Will Mean, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/12/us/polit-
ics/minorities-worry-what-a-law-and-order-donald-trump-presidency-will-mean.html, archived
at https://perma.cc/892G-LF3P; Kevin Johnson, With a President Trump, and Emphasis on
‘Law and Order,’ U.S.A. TODAY (Nov. 9, 2016), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/
elections/2016/11/09/donald-trump-criminal-justice/93550162/, archived at https://perma.cc/
T4RY-GAZW.
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Demonstrably, in terms of the appeal of resorting to law and order in
response to urban violence and unrest, little appears to have changed since
the l960s.  The same can be said for the problems that the Department of
Justice found to be at the core of the turbulence in Ferguson.
D. Federal Response: The DOJ Investigation
In September 2014, the Civil Rights Division of the DOJ commenced
an investigation of the FPD to determine whether it was engaged in a pattern
or practice of conduct towards African-American citizens that violated the
Constitution and federal law.295  The DOJ ultimately concluded that the FPD,
in conjunction with the city’s municipal court system, had, over an extended
period of time, exhibited patterns of behavior that violated the First, Fourth,
and Fourteenth Amendments.296  Specifically, the DOJ found that an over-
emphasis on revenue generation, rather than public safety, contributed sig-
nificantly to the FPD’s unconstitutional conduct.297  Furthermore, the prac-
tices of the FPD and the municipal courts were found to reflect and enhance
the “existing racial bias” that permeated Ferguson’s law enforcement sys-
tem.298  The parallels between the 1965 Clark Report and the DOJ’s findings
and recommendations for reform are impossible to ignore.
Most telling, the DOJ’s Report found — as Ramsey Clark had with
Watts — that there was considerable mistrust in Ferguson between the black
community and the FPD, which undermined law enforcement’s legitimacy.299
The lack of trust was further found to be longstanding and primarily “attrib-
utable to Ferguson’s approach to law enforcement.”300  In particular, the
DOJ’s Report stated that its “investigation showed that the disconnect and
distrust between much of Ferguson’s African-American community and FPD
is caused largely by years of the unlawful and unfair law enforcement prac-
tices by Ferguson’s police department and municipal court.”301  Notably,
even the FPD and other city officials acknowledge the “deep divide between
[the] police and . . . black residents.”302
As in Watts, the DOJ found evidence of a pattern of overly-aggressive
police practices disparately directed towards African-American residents of
Ferguson.303  Specifically, almost 90% of documented instances of the use of
295 See FPD REPORT, supra note 278, at 1.
296 See id.
297 See id. at 2.
298 Id.
299 See id.
300 Id. at 5.
301 Id. at 79.
302 Id. at 80.  Ferguson’s Mayor admitted “that there is ‘clearly mistrust’ of FPD by many
community members, including a ‘systemic problem’ with youth not wanting to work with
police.” Id.
303 See id. at 28.  For specific examples of brutality exhibited by FPD officers, see id. at
29–38.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLC\52-2\HLC202.txt unknown Seq: 47  7-JUN-17 11:17
2017] Different Lyrics, Same Song 351
force by the FPD were against members of the black community.304  A
pointed example of abusive force by the FPD is its use of canines in unwar-
ranted situations, exclusively against African-Americans.305  The FPD’s own
records reveal that “canine officers use dogs out of proportion to the threat
posed by the people they encounter.”306  As further described in the Report,
“FPD officers’ use of canines reflects a culture in which officers choose not
to use the skills and tactics that could resolve a situation without injuries,
and instead deploy tools and methods that are almost guaranteed to produce
an injury of some type.”307
Apart from the discriminatory pattern of physically abusive behavior by
the FPD, the DOJ found that the general treatment of black residents re-
flected a level of disrespect that aggravated the tension and mistrust between
police officers and the community.  The DOJ stated that: “In the documents
we reviewed, the meetings we observed and participated in, and in the hun-
dreds of conversations Civil Rights Division staff had with residents of Fer-
guson and the surrounding area, many residents, primarily African-
American residents, described being belittled, disbelieved, and treated with
little regard for their legal rights by the [FPD].”308
In terms of confrontations between the FPD and Ferguson residents, the
Report documented a longstanding propensity of officers to escalate en-
counters when they perceived subjects to be disobeying their orders or re-
sisting arrest. These escalations disproportionately and overwhelmingly
affected black citizens.309  Furthermore, the Report found there to be a signif-
icant disparate impact on African-Americans in Ferguson in terms of en-
counters with the police.310  The evidence gathered demonstrated that from
2012 to 2014, “African Americans accounted for 85% of FPD’s traffic stops,
90% of FPD’s citations, and 93% of FPD’s arrests,” despite comprising only
67% of the city’s population.311  In addition to the palpable unequal impact,
the DOJ’s investigation also uncovered ample evidence of racial bias and
stereotyping by members of the FPD.312  Moreover, “[t]his evidence . . .,
together with evidence that Ferguson has long recognized but failed to cor-
304 See id. at 28.
305 See id. at 31 (noting that “in every canine bite incident for which racial information is
available, the subject was African American”).
306 Id. at 31.
307 Id. at 33.
308 Id. at 79. Cf. supra note 138 and accompanying text (noting the non-physical, demean-
ing treatment to which black residents of Watts were subjected).
309 See FPD REPORT, supra note 278, at 28 (“Many officers are quick to escalate en-
counters with subjects they perceive to be disobeying their orders or resisting arrest.”); see
also id. at 26 (“That FPD officers believe criticism and insolence are grounds for arrest, and
that supervisors have condoned such unconstitutional policing, reflects intolerance for even
lawful opposition to the exercise of police authority.”).
310 See id. at 62 (“African Americans experience disparate impact in nearly every aspect
of Ferguson’s law enforcement system.”).
311 Id.
312 See id. at 71 (“Our investigation uncovered direct evidence of racial bias in the com-
munications of influential Ferguson decision makers.  In email messages and during inter-
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rect the consistent racial disparities caused by its police and court practices”
led the DOJ to conclude “that the discriminatory effects of Ferguson’s con-
duct are driven at least in part by discriminatory intent in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment.”313
Given the DOJ’s exclusive focus on issues related to law enforcement
in Ferguson, it did not directly address the source of the civil unrest that
occurred in the wake of Michael Brown’s shooting.  Nevertheless, it is clear
that, as in Watts, toxic police-community relations contributed substantially
to the rioting.314  These relations inevitably created feelings of despair and
diminished self worth.  When combined with the same underlying problems
present in 1965-Watts — namely, poverty, unemployment, poor education,
and a sense of alienation315 — it should come as little surprise that an act of
police violence against an unarmed black man that goes unpunished,
whether justified or not, would generate a similar community response in
2014.
The DOJ’s findings regarding the FPD led it to proffer a number of
recommendations for reform, which were later embodied in a federal Con-
sent Decree agreed to by the City of Ferguson.  The essence of many of these
proposals could have been lifted from recommendations contained in the
Clark Report.
The most dramatic example, however, relates to the emphasis in both
reports on the critical importance of establishing a culture of community
policing.  In this regard, the Clark Report called for, among other things, the
“[c]ultivation of programs designed to provide broad and frequent social
contact between citizens and individual policemen”316 and human relations
training of police officers to enable them to better understand and empathize
with the community they served.317  The DOJ’s Report recommended that the
FPD “increase opportunities for officers to have frequent, positive interac-
tions with people outside of an enforcement context, especially groups that
views, several court and law enforcement personnel expressed discriminatory views and
intolerance with regard to race, religion, and national origin.”).
313 Id. at 52.
314 See Elijah Anderson, What Caused the Ferguson Riot Exists in so Many Other Cities,
Too, WASH. POST (Aug. 13, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2014/
08/13/what-caused-the-ferguson-riot-exists-in-so-many-other-cities-too/, archived at https://
perma.cc/ZR6Q-YLV3 (maintaining that “[u]nder authoritarian oversight and normalized po-
lice harassment, a generation of young people were bound to get fed up and respond with the
violence and turmoil we are witnessing in Ferguson”).
315 See Gerald Early, Why Ferguson was Ready to Explode, TIME (Aug. 14, 2014), http://
time.com/3111727/ferguson-missouri-michael-brown-hyper-segregated/, archived at https://
perma.cc/3QK9-4M7K. Cf. Henson, supra note 283, at 1013–14 (observing that there remains
a “reservoir of underlying grievances” in black communities, including, most prominently,
“police practices and underemployment or unemployment”) (internal citations omitted).
316 CLARK REPORT, supra note 12, at 51. R
317 See id. at 60 (observing that “[w]hile such training cannot guarantee a reduction in the
conflict between police and all segments of the Negro community, experience shows that it
can make a contribution to the lessening of tensions and increased respect and support for
police”).
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have expressed high levels of distrust of police.”318  The Report also ex-
pressed the need for police training in “crime-prevention, officer safety, and
anti-discrimination advantages of community policing.”319
At their cores, both Reports expose the existence of an endemic and
debilitating ethos of distrust between the black community and law enforce-
ment.  The Clark Report proposed methods for alleviating this fundamental
concern, not only in South Los Angeles, but also in urban areas throughout
the country.  The fact that the DOJ is singing the same tune in 2015 is dis-
heartening, to say the least, but more ominously, it demonstrates the power-
ful preemptive effect of the politics of law and order.
VI. CONCLUSION: LAW AND ORDER IS THE PROBLEM,
NOT THE SOLUTION
Law and order today remains a code phrase that, to many, connotes
legal control of the less powerful, the marginalized — by and large, black
people.  Contemporary calls for such control are not far removed from other
forms of socioeconomic and political restraint employed throughout history
by the white majority against African-Americans.  Slavery and Jim Crow
clearly represented the politics of law and order by another name.320  In the
aftermath of the Watts riots, the palpable embodiment of the mantra was
political condemnation of black civil disobedience, accompanied by calls for
stronger law enforcement measures to legally constrain that behavior as well
as the uncivil disobedience being employed by black rioters.
The law-and-order rhetoric evaded the underlying problems that
plagued black America and sustained the combustible mixture that recur-
rently erupted into urban unrest.  It was easier and more expedient politically
to focus on and exploit the symptom rather than work to provide a cure.  It
was also a familiar historical pattern.  Whenever blacks were perceived as
getting out of line, the proverbial response was to crack down.  When slaves
rebelled, the whips were cracked.  When Jim Crow was breached, brutal
beatings and jail soon followed.  When black urban frustration manifested
itself in rioting, a paramilitary show of force was in order to quell the distur-
bance and to deter similar outbreaks in the future.  In short, when African-
Americans behave in a manner that can be characterized as unlawful, the
habitual response has been to emphasize and reinforce the concept of law
and order.321
Ramsey Clark understood, perhaps like no other white person, the ab-
surdity and futility of this approach.  In investigating the Watts riots, he lis-
318 FPD REPORT, supra note 278, at 90.
319 Id.
320 See ALEXANDER, supra note 15, at 22–35.
321 See generally 13TH (Netflix 2016) (chronicling the various methods by which blacks
have been subjugated throughout American history, including the nation’s approach to criminal
justice).
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tened to black people and learned of the debilitating hopelessness and
despair about which President Johnson had waxed so eloquently during his
Howard commencement address.  Clark felt their pain and alienation and
recognized that the devastating combination of unemployment, poor educa-
tion, rampant poverty, and antagonistic police-community relations were the
real problems — not the looting or burning or acts of civil disobedience.
The latter were simply efforts to be heard.  Law and order, therefore, served
only to silence the very purpose behind the unrest.
The Clark Report issued a daunting prescription for the ills of Watts and
black America in general.  To meaningfully address the urban discontent,
everyone — local and national political leaders, civic organizations, white
people, and black people — would have to be willing to work together to
undertake the massive, sustained effort needed.  More than anything else,
what was required was a wholesale commitment to making things right, or at
least better, for African-Americans.  And, as the Kerner Commission point-
edly stressed, this entailed white America being willing to acknowledge and
accept responsibility for the pernicious effect of racism on blacks, which
was viewed as a fundamental component of continuing urban distress.
The Clark Report was suppressed and the Kerner Report quickly be-
came a historical relic.  Working to cure a disease that might ultimately
prove incurable was not a recipe for election to high office.  Re-characteriz-
ing the malady as a menace and calling for its containment was much more
electorally savvy.  And that is the path that national leader after national
leader has taken, from President Johnson through a succession of subsequent
Presidents and candidates.  The politics of law and order, thereby stagnated
any hope for progress, and America today is essentially where it was fifty-
one years ago.
Men and women of color continue to be unjustly targeted and brutal-
ized by law enforcement.  When outrage is voiced and “black lives matter”
is chanted in response to the law-and-order chorus, many still refuse to lis-
ten.  Instead — missing the point yet again — law-and-order politicians re-
flexively counter with “all lives matter,” highlighting the fact that they are
unwilling to listen.322  And so the status quo marches on.
At the conclusion of the Kerner Report, the Commission included a
quote from the testimony of noted African-American psychologist Dr. Ken-
neth Clark in which he compared the history of urban unrest and response in
America to Alice in Wonderland:
I read that report . . . of the 1919 riot in Chicago, and it is as if
I were reading the report of the investigating committee on the
Harlem riot of ’35, the report of the investigating committee on the
Harlem riot of ’43, the report of the McCone Commission on the
Watts riot [of ‘65].
322 See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 293.
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I must again in candor say to you members of this Commis-
sion — it is a kind of Alice in Wonderland — with the same mov-
ing picture re-shown over and over again, the same analysis, the
same recommendations, and the same inaction.323
His assessment is a powerful indictment of the effect of the politics of
law and order.  They have kept American society stationary and the DOJ’s
Report does not offer much in the way of contemporary hope.  If anything, it
only serves to confirm the societal stagnation.
Is change possible, or is America hopelessly destined to have the pre-
sent continue to repeat the past when it comes to race relations?  History
suggests the latter, but it also reveals that if there is to ever be even a glim-
mer of optimism, political leaders must finally acknowledge the wisdom
within and accept the challenge posed by the Clark Report.  They need to
recognize the importance of giving a real “voice” to the unheard and accept
the immense difficulty of the vital task ahead — the necessity for patient,
determined, and massive effort.
For race relations to genuinely progress in America, leaders must com-
mit with compassion and courage to engaging in the hard work that is neces-
sary to do what is right.324  More importantly, however, individual citizens
must take stock of who they are and what they believe, seek to understand
one another, and disregard their differences to work together side by side.
As Ramsey Clark simply and eloquently put it in reference to Watts:
Ultimately, the problems [that] exploded into violence in Los
Angeles are problems of how human beings treat one another, not
only through the institutions of their society, but individually.
Hope for the future rests on the good will and hard work of all our
people.325
323 KERNER REPORT, supra note 7, at 483. R
324 In remarks following the Baltimore riots in April of 2015, President Obama ventured
off the familiar path and candidly stated what he felt needed to be done in order to address the
ills at the heart of such urban unrest, while at the same time acknowledging the countervailing
attractiveness of a law and order response:
But if we really want to solve the problem, if our society really wanted to solve
the problem, we could. It’s just it would require everybody saying this is important,
this is significant – and that we don’t just pay attention to these communities when a
CVS burns, and we don’t just pay attention when a young man gets shot or has his
spine snapped. We’re paying attention all the time because we consider those kids
our kids, and we think they’re important. And they shouldn’t be living in poverty and
violence. . . .
But I think we all understand that the politics of that are tough because it’s easy to
ignore those problems or to treat them just as a law and order issue, as opposed to a
broader social issue.
President Barack Obama, Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Abe of Japan in
Joint Press Conference (April 28, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/
04/28/remarks-president-obama-and-prime-minister-abe-japan-joint-press-confere, archived at
https://perma.cc/B7GL-67LG.
325 CLARK REPORT, supra note 12, at 3. R
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLC\52-2\HLC202.txt unknown Seq: 52  7-JUN-17 11:17
356 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 52
If this simple truth is not recognized and embraced, especially by
America’s leaders, the lyrics may change, but the song will remain the same.
Politicians must resist the expedient allure of the law-and-order melody so
they can listen to the voices of the unheard.  Only then will they be able to
compose a more optimistic and constructive anthem.
